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1. Introduction
Tms paper examines ways and means of increasing the financial
capabilities of state governments through adjustments in federal-state-
local fiscal relations. Federalism, to be sure, creates problems at the
federal level as well, but these do not relate primarily to fiscal capa-
bility. In a sense our primary concern is for the financial capabilities
of local governments, since much of the initial impact of rising
civilian governmental costs is on them. However, cities, counties,
towns and school districts are the wards of the states and their
problems the states' problems.
During the last five years for which official data are available,
1953—57, state and local "general government" absorbed nearly $200
billion for direct general expenditures, capital outlay for local utilities,
debt redemption, employee-retirement systems and increases in fund
balances (Table 1).
To finance these expenditures, state and local governments raised
$149 billion from their own revenue sources—from taxes, fines, fees
and licenses, interest earnings and the operation of utility and other
business enterprises. This left a gap of about $49 billion, bridged by
financial aid from the federal government (about $16 billion) and
and by borrowing (about $33 billion).
This gap—about $10 billion per annum—is one quantitative
approximation of the fiscal problem of state and local governments
with which we are here concerned and for which solutions are
sought. It is, however, little more than an approximation of that
problem.
The magnitudes cited measure state and local performance—the
amounts spent—and not the amounts that would have been spent if
adequate resources had been available to finance a level of govern-
mental service consistent with need. No measure is available of the
Note. This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the above agencies.
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TABLE1
Stateand Local "General Government" Operations, 1953—57
Use of funds: In millions
Direct general expenditure $169,484•
Capital outlay for local government utilities 5,146
Debt redemption 12,037
Contribution to employee retirement systems 5,1168
Increase in cash and security holdings (exclusive of
insurance trust funds) 7,095
Total (net of duplication) $198,003b
Sourceof funds:
General revenue from own sources $144,229
Net current surplus of utilities and liquor stores 4,4Q7c
Intergovernmental revenue from Federal Government 16,140
Borrowing 33,057
Total $197,833
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Governments Division.
SDerivedby subtracting from the total increase ($6,427 million) in retirement fund
assets, the excess ($1,311 million) of their receipts, from employee contributions and
investment earnings over their payments of benefits and withdrawals.
bLessthan the sum of detail by $875 million, representing employer contributions
by local governments to state administered employee retirement systems, included
above in both "Direct general expenditure" and "Contributions to employee retirement
systems."
CTheexcess of aggregate utility revenues over expenditures for utility operations and
utility interest.
degree to which state and local performance fell short of need, apart
from such fragmentary information as classroom shortages, deficient
instruction programs, substandard health and recreation facilities, etc.
Moreover, the magnitudes cited pertain to the past. They have been
increasing and will continue to increase. During these five years alone,
the size of the annual gap as here defined, i.e., the amounts borrowed
and obtained as federal aid, increased from $6.4 billion to over $10
billion. The projections presented to this conference and other fore-
casts suggest continuing increases in future years.
The magnitudes shown in Table 1 understate the problem also
because they are global for the country as a whole, and conceal
substantial deviations from the average in individual jurisdictions.
Despite the upgrading of the less productive sections of the country,
economic inequality continues to characterize the states and 'the
political subdivisions within individual states. As subsequent discus-
sion indicates, this uneven geographic distribution of resources is the
genesis of many problems in federal-state fiscal relations.
In posing the problem in terms of state-local financial require-
ments, there is no intention to suggest that it exclusively or primarily
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concerns only state and local governments. Problems at the state
level quickly become matters for national and federal concern.
Current preoccupation with the inadequacy of the states' public
education systems provides a timely illustration, but one no more
dramatic than national concern in earlier years with the inability
of state governments to cope adequately with unemployment or the
inadequacy of their resources for the payment of unemployment
benefits during the 1957-58 recession. Neither is it our intention to
suggest that the problem of federalism is primarily one of dollars
and cents. The philosophical values involved are indeed important
and their implications for the functioning of the political institutions
—for democratic government itself—recognized.1 It is, however, in
financial terms that the problem of intergovernmental relations is
generally presented. It is in financial terms that it will be relieved.
One or two additional stipulations. Intergovernmental problems
in a federalism do not admit of absolute solutions. A system of
government wherein the severalstates with unequal economic
resources undertake to conduct many of their affairs as one nation
while retaining an important measure of sovereignty with respect to
large sectors of governmental activity, can never be free of problems.
If some of these do not lend themselves to neat solutions, they do
lend themselves to accommodation.2 Such accommodation,moreover,
is likely to involve the established tools of intergovernmental relation-
ships, rather than new arrangements still uninvented. The tools
are familiar; the debate concerns largely the use to be made of them,
how and when and under what circumstances? This paper answers
very few of these questions. It aims to be constructive, not by pro-
viding new answers—but rather, by examining old ones and by dis-
posing of some misconceptions. This accounts for the uneven
allotment of space among the subjects treated, frequently at variance
with their relative revenue importance. The purpose here is not to
treat federal-state-local relations comprehensively and systematically.
We limit ourselves to problems which we can illuminate with the
quantitative data we have been able to assemble.3
1Fora constructive formulation of the philosophy of contemporary American
federalism see the Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, GPO,
June 1955, and William Anderson, The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners?,
University of Minnesota Press, 1955.
2Committeeon Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, Federal,State, and Local
GovernmentFiscal Relations, SenateDoc. 69, 78th Cong., 1st sess., GPO, 1943.
The presentation is unbalanced even in this restricted sense, because our examination
has proceeded further on some phases of the subject than on others.
137PROBLEMS CREATED BY MULTILEVEL POLITICAL STRUCTURE
The sections which follow examine a variety of suggestions for
augmenting the financial resources of state and local governments
through intergovernmental action. The areas of taxation, debt
financing, and federal financial aid are discussed in this order.
2. Revenues of State and Local Governments
from their Own Sources
In fiscal year 1957, taxes produced $29 billion for state and local
governments and financed approximately 70 per cent of their general
government expenditures. Borrowing, federal aid and miscellaneous
charges and receipts, including utility and liquor store profits,
provided the balance. Our concern in this section is with tax revenues;
how adjustments in federal-state relations would affect them. The
revenue import of the several components of the state and local tax
structure is summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2







Taxes, total $20,908 $29,042 38.9 10O.0%
Property 9,375 13,097 39.7 45.1
Individual income 1,065 1,767 65.9 6.1
Corporation income 817 984 20.4 3.4
Sales and gross receipts





































Motor vehicle and operator
licenses 1,012 1,462 44.5
All other taxes 1,485 1,924 29.6 6.6
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Summary of Governmental Finances.
aThe1957 Census of Governments reports total state and local taxes of $28,817
million. The property tax accounts for most of the $225 million reduction.
A. PROPERTY TAX
The number one revenue producer isstill the long-maligned
property tax. It supplies 45 per cent of the tax revenues of state and
local governments and since it has become principally a local as
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distinguished from a state tax, its contribution to local revenues is
relatively much larger, 87 per cent.4
Despiteitswell-publicized limitations, including alleged un-
responsiveness to changing levels of employment and economic
activity, the property tax is holding its own. Between 1953 and 1957,
when total state and local tax collections increased 38.9 per cent,
the property tax yield increased 39.7 per cent. By virtue of its domi-
nant role in state-local tax systems, the property tax influences
appreciably the behavior of total tax collections. Several factors are
contributing to the rising revenue yield of property taxes. The large
volume of new construction and the steady upward trend in the level
of tax rates are the principal ones. Lesser, but nonetheless significant
contributors are improved assessment techniques and reduced tax
delinquencies. State legislatures are taking an increased interest in
up-dating tax assessments to relieve the pressure for state financial aid
to local jurisdictions, and where distribution of state aid is partially
based on local need, to curb the tendency to reduce local assessments
in order to demonstrate greater local need.
Since the federal government levies no property taxes, problems of
overlapping do not arise. Note should be taken, however, of deduc-
tibility of property taxes for federal income tax purposes, since it
reduces the net burden of local property taxes for federal income
taxpayers who itemize deductions. Deductibility of property taxes is
especially important for the larger corporations, since it effectively
shifts approximately half of their tax to the federal government.
A problem of major importance for a limited number of local
jurisdictions is the immunity of federal property from local taxation,
and for a substantially larger number of communities, the tax exemp-
tion of properties owned by the state and by religious, educational,
charitable and similar nonprofit organizations. Federal-state relations
are involved in only the first of these.5
Under the doctrine of reciprocal tax immunity first enunciated by
As used in this document, the term "states" excludes Alaska and Hawaii.
In view of the dominant role of the property tax in the fiscal capabilities of local
governments and the impairment of these capabilities by deficient tax administration, an
examination of possibilities for enhancing local fiscal capacity through federal action
should properly explore opportunities available at the national level for influencing
the qiAality of property tax administration. The data on assessment practices (ratios)
assembled in connection with the 1957 Census of Governments, underscore the urgency
of this problem and could serve as the basis of a nation-wide effort to improve assess-
ment practices through the dissemination of information and technical assistance, or
possibly through matching grants to finance state-wide assessment procedure studies.
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Chief Justice Marshall in 1817 and stillgenerally maintained,
property owned by the federal government or its instrumentalities is
not subject to state or local taxation without explicit congressional
consent. Congress has consented in only a few instances, notably
with respect to the real property of the now-liquidated Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and certain other lending agencies. More often
but still infrequently, Congress has authorized payments designated
as "in lieu of taxes," and in a few situations, federal grants in recogni-
tion of the tax immunity of federal properties. For the fiscal year
1955, aggregate payments associated with the nontaxability of
federal property were estimated at $276 miffion and consisted of:
In millions
Property taxes $2.9












The vast bulk of federal property, whether measured by acreage,
number of parcels, or value, is at present immune from payments
directly or indirectly associated with the prevailing property tax
system for financing local government. While its current value is not
known, it clearly is substantial. The accumulated historical cost of
real property owned by the federal government within the continental
United States was estimated in 1958 at approximately $55 billion for
land and improvements. The accumulated cost of federally owned
tangible personal property was probably over $150 billion. The bulk
6SenateCommittee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Payments of
Taxes, or in Lieu of Taxes, to State or Local Taxing Units, Hearings on S. 826. .. (and
other bills), part 2, pp. 337—41, April 19 and 20, 1956.
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of the land acreage is in the public domain and never was in taxable
ownership; moreover, itincludes vast areas with little present
market value.
Many of the government's most valuable properties—and those
most nearly resembling in physical characteristics and use typical
privately owned taxable properties—were acquired or built during
and after World War II. Federal properties sold to private users and
turned to otherwise taxable business use have been held off the tax
rolls until title passed from the federal government or payments
under purchase contracts were completed. Moreover, some federal
agencies, such as the military services and the AEC, have taken title
and thus have extended the federal tax immunity to much personal
property acquired and used or held by private contractors under
their direction.
Questions concerning payments to state and local governments on
account of federal government properties have been the subject of
long controversy, numerous studies, voluminous documentation,
dozens of legislative proposals, and a few limited statutory enact-
ments over the last two decades.
Investigators generally agree that the central question. is one of
equity—equity between the taxpayers of the federal and of the
several local governments. As in most questions of equity, the dis-
agreement arises over what constitutes a fair arrangement for action.
The broad practical question is essentially this: How can the national
government carry on its operations and hold property without
imposing special burdens upon the taxpayers of communities where
the operations or properties are disproportionately large ?8There
are, however, subsidiary practical questions. One relates, for example,
to the like treatment of similarly used properties where the use of
the federally owned property is in competition with taxable private
property. This and other collateral issues complicate any effort to
draft a concrete program or policy.
Canada has tried a solution involving payments, in a limited
category of cases, for disproportionate amounts of national govern-
ment property. A somewhat similar proposal, but with a "hardship
House Committee on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Federal Real
and Personal Property Inventory Report as of June 30, 1958, pp. 11, 139. The real
property total includes $9 billion public domain realty estimated at approximate
current value.
8Councilof State Governments, Federal-State Relations, Senate Doc. 81, 81st Cong.,
1stsess., pp.114—20.
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test" attached, was received by the Congress without enthusiasm or
action.9
Court decisions have highlighted some issues. One group of three
interrelated Supreme Court decisions, rendered in 1958, is of parti-
cular current interest. The Court ruled that:
1. Leased realty exempt to the United States as owner may, nevertheless, under a
Michigan statute relating to tax-exempt property, be taxable to a private corporate
lessee (the Borg-Warner Corporation) using the property in a business conducted for
profit. Two justices dissented. (U.S. et a!., v. City of Detroit, March 3, 1958, 355 U.s.
466.)
2. Real property exempt to the United States as owner but used by a private corpora-
tion (the Continental Corporation) under a use-permit, without rental payment, in
performing supply contracts for the government may, under the same Michigan statute,
be taxable to the private user. In this case, also, the decision was 7 to 2. (U.S. v. Town-
shsp ofMuskegon, et a!., March3,1958, 355 U.S.484.)
3. Personal property owned by the United States and used by a subcontractor under
a prime contract between two other private companies and the United States may be
taxable under the Michigan personal property tax law to the party in possession. In
this decision, in which the Court was divided 5 to 4[buta rehearing was later denied],
the tax was considered by the majority to be a tax "for the privilege of using or posses-
sing" the personal property, rather than a tax on the government's interest in the
property. (City of Detroit, et a!., v. Murray Corporation of America, et a!., March 3,
1958, 355 U.S. 489.)
Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion in the Continental case in-
cluded this comment:
"The case might well be different if the government had reserved such control over
the activities and financial gain of Continental that it could properly be called a
'servant' of the United States in agency terms. But here Continental was not so
assimilated by the government as to become one of its constituent parts." (355 U.S.
486.)
Mr. Justice Black observed for the majority in the Borg-Warner
decision:
"Today the United States does business with a vast number of private parties. In
this Court the trend has been to reject immunizing these private parties from non-
discriminatory state taxes as a matter of constitutional law. Cf. Penn-Dairies v. Milk
Control System, 318 U.S. 261, 270. Of course, this is not to say that Congress, acting
within the proper scope of its power, cannot confer immunity by statute where it does
not exist constitutionally. Wise and flexible adjustment of intergovernmental tax
immunity calls for political and economic considerations of the greatest difficulty and
delicacy. Such complex are ones which Congress is best qualified to resolve."
(355 U.S. 474.)
In his prevailing opinion in the Murray case, Mr. Justice Black
added:
"We find nothing in the Constitution which compels us to strike down these state
taxes. There was no discrimination against the federal government, its property or
those with whom it does business. There was no crippling obstruction of any of the
government's function, no sinister effort to hamstring its power, not even the slightest
Senate Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings on
S. 826. .., part2, pp. 327—33.
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interference with its property. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316. In such
circumstances, the Congress is the proper agency, as we pointed out in U.S. v. City
of Detroit, to make the difficult policy decisions necessarily involved in determining
whether and to what extent private parties who do business with the Government
should be given immunity from state taxes." (355 U.S. 495.)
If inferences are warranted from the 1958 decisions and recent
congressional consideration of the subject, they may perhaps be
summarized in this way:
1. In certain circumstances, even in the absence of explicit con-
gressional consent to taxation, the Supreme Court is disposed to
uphold the authority of the states to levy nondiscriminatory taxes
upon private industrial users of government-owned property, real
or personal, and to permit the amount of the tax to be measured by
the value of the property. There is a greater division over personal
property than over real property.
2. Congressional action will be required if there is to be any
marked shift of policy from the present prevalent pattern of immunity
of federal property from both actual taxes and the payment of
amounts "in lieu of property taxes."
3. The interest generated by World War II and the Korean
property acquisitions brought forth many proposals but no compre-
hensive congressional action. At present there is nothing to suggest
that Congress will soon be disposed to lay down a general policy
providing comprehensively for payments either of property taxes or
in lieu of property taxes on account of federally owned properties.
Doubtless there will continue to be piecemeal enactments dealing
with selected problems, much as the court decisions will continue
to resolve particular cases or to focus attention upon the complexities
of the problem.
As controversy continues, both the local governments and the
property-owning federal agencies publicize estimates of tremendous
amounts of property tax revenue that are supposed to be involved in
the issue of federal immunity. Often, however, these estimates make
little or no allowance for prevailing practices of underassessment
and nonassessment and for other institutional characteristics of the
property tax system which would—or, at least, should—be invoked
to assure equitable treatment of the federal government. As a result,
the relative fiscal importance of even the broadest proposals is often
exaggerated. Currently active legislative proposals are of relatively
limited proportions—to relieve communities genuinely damaged.1°
S. 910, 86th Cong., 1st sess.
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Substantially broader programs appear unlikely at this time in view
of the widespread, almost emotional attachment to the concept of
constitutional immunity and the unyielding attitude of state and
local governments to the income tax immunity of their own securities.
In summary, then, a significant modification of the tax immunity
now generally applicable to property of the federal government does
not appear to be among the reasonable expectations for near-term
practicable solutions to the revenue needs of local governments.
Indeed, there is no visible prospect for an accommodation or innova-
tion that would still the continuing controversy in this area of inter-
level fiscal relations.
B. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
The classic example of tax overlapping is the individual income
tax, now employed at all three governmental levels, federal, state,
and local.
Individual income taxation was introduced at approximately the
same time by the federal government and some states. Most of the
states, however, entered the field a decade or more after adoption of
the federal income tax in 1913. City and county levies are largely a
World War II phenomenon.
Thirty-one states (and the District of Columbia) now tax individual
incomes.1' All but two of these use broaldy based taxes applying
generally to all income. The two exceptions, New Hampshire and
Tennessee, limit their taxes to interest and dividends. Local govern-
ments in five states levy income taxes. In only two (Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania), however, are local taxes widespread and neither of these has
a state-wide tax. Of the other three in which the local tax overlaps
the state tax, in Alabama and Missouri the local tax occurs only once
each; inKentucky five times. Local taxes are uniformly imposed at low
flat rates and typically apply only to salaries, wages and net profits of
unincorporated businesses and professions. Some local tax bases
include rental income; none is believed to include investment income.
In 1957 individual income taxes produced about 6 per cent of state
and local tax revenues. This represented some increase since 1953,
when they accounted for about 5 per cent, and presumably is attribu-
table to the rise in the level of personal income and to tax rate
11Thedescriptions of state tax systems throughout this chapter are as of January 1,
1959, as reported by Commerce Clearing House, State Tax Reporter. Significant changes
can be anticipated in 1959 since revenue problems confront many of the 46 States in
which the legislatures meet in regular sessions this year.
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increases. More effective enforcement, notably the introduction of
withholding at the source by eleven states, has also been a factor.
Significantly, not a single new state individual income tax has been
enacted in twenty years and more than one-third (36.3 per cent) of the
United States population is still free of income taxation in its home
state. Significantly, also, these people are concentrated in the older
industrialstates;Connecticut,Illinois,Michigan, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
On a national scale and measured in terms of tax dollars collected,
federal-state tax overlapping in individual income taxation is rela-
tively small. All individual income taxes collected by state
ments in 1958 aggregated $1.6 billion, equivalent to 4.5 per cent of
federal tax collections from this source. In other words, the aggregate
impact of all state imposed taxes is of the general magnitude of a 1 1/4
percentage point change in the first bracket rate of the federal tax. In
the 31 states with income taxes, 1958 state collections averaged about
8 per cent of federal collections. However, as will be noted by reference
to Table 3, the weight of state income tax collections, as measured by
the amount of federal tax collections, has been increasing steadily, if
slowly, during the past few years (reflecting in part federal tax
reductions and in part the sharper graduation of state rate schedules).
The relative weight of state income taxes varies widely. In seven
states the ratio of state to federal collections in 1958 was less than
5 per cent and in another twelve less than 10 per cent. In twelve
states, this percentage exceeded 10 percent and in five of these,
15 per cent (Table 4).
These percentages, it should be emphasized, serve only as approxi-
mations of the relative weight of state taxes. Federal tax collections
are tabulated on the basis of states in which they were paid, which in
some cases does not conform to liability for state taxes. Moreover,
since federal tax collection statistics combine the individual income
tax with the OASI employment taxes, the amount of federal income
tax collections had to be estimated. This was done by applying the
national ratio of income tax collections to combined income and
payroll tax collections for the particular year to the combined
collections reported for each state. As a result, federal collections in
the less industrialized states are probably somewhat understated.'2
12However,a state-by-state comparison of state tax collections with federal tax
liabilities reported on unaudited income tax returns (as reported in Statistics of Income)
does not provide too much support for this generalization.
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TABLE 3
Individual Income Tax: State Collections as Percentage of
Federal Collections, 1953—58
FISCAL YEARS
STATE 1953 1954 1955
ENDINGIN
1953—
1957 1958 1958 1956
Alabamaa 5.2%4.9 5.6 7.7° 8.0 7.8 6.7
Arizonaa 6.6 7.6 7.9 10.1 9.0 6.5 7.9
Arkansas 4.0 4.1 4.7 4.8 4.7 6.3 4.8
California 3.3 3.4 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.3 3.9
Colorado 3.6 3.8 4•7c 4.6 4.9 4.9 4.5
1.5 5,3c 6.1 6.7 6.2 9.0 5.8
Georgia 4.2 4.0 4.9 6.3 6.6 6.7 5.5
Idaho 9.3 7.8 8.5 12.9C 12.1 13.8 10.9
Iowa 6.0 6.7 7.2 7.9 8.5 8.3 7.5
Kansas 4.4 4.6 5.4 5.0 4.9 5.4 4.9
Kentucky 8.4 8.6 14.8° 11.8 16.3 17.1 13.0
Louisianaa 4.6 4.2 4.8 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.2
Marylandb 2.8 3.3 3.8 7.1° 7.3 7.8 5.3
Massachusetts 7.9 7.5 8.5 10.7 10.2 10.0 9.2
Minnesota 10.0 10.5 11.8 11.9 11.5 12.7 11.4
Mississippi 6.2 6.0 4.6 4.6 5.6 5.9 5.5
Missouria 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.7 2,8 3.1 2.5
Montana 6.3 6.6 7.2 9.7° 8.9 11.0 8.4
New Hampshired 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
New Mexicoa 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.4
New York 6.8 6.9 7.4 6.1 8.1 8.7 7.7
North Carolina 11.1 11.6 12.5 12.9 13.2 13.8 12.6
North Dakota 6.9 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.2
Oklahoma 3.2 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.2 3.8
Oregon 15.3 15.5 16.5 23.5°29.4 28.7°21.7
South Carolina 9.0 9.4 9.7 10.9 10.8 11.2 10.2
Tennesseed 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3
Utah 6.4 6.9 8.0 9.1 9.7 11.1 8.7
Vermont 15.0 14.1 15.3 20.9 20.6 21.6 18.1
Virginia 9.3 10.8 12.1 11.4 14.0 14.0
Wisconsin 11.4 12.5 13.8 16.0 16.7 17.4 14.8
Total (31 states) 5.7 6.0 6.6 7.6 8.0 7.1
Total (U.S.) 3.2 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.3 4.5 3.9
Caution:Thesedata are subject to important limitations and the reader is urged to
consider the qualifications noted in the accompanying text in interpreting them.
SOURCE:Federalcollections from Annual Report(s) of the Com,nissioner of Internal
Revenue, State collections from Bureau of the Census, State Tax Collections.
a Since reported state income tax collections include both the individual and cor-
porate tax, the computation is based on state and federal collections from both taxes.
bIncludesDistrict of Columbia.
°Includesmore than one year's liabilities incident to the introduction of withholding.
The state tax is limited to interest and dividends.
e Reflects increases in the rate of withholding.
Includes more than one year's liabilities resulting from advancement of tax due
dates.
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TABLE4
IndividualIncome Tax: State Collections as a Percentage of
Federal Collections, 1953 and 1958
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
Under 5 Per Cent
5 Per Cent to
Per Cent



















Colorado 3.6 Idaho 9.3 Wisconsin 11.4
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Caution: These data are subject to important limitations and the reader is urged to consider the
qualifications noted in the accompanying text in interpreting them.
SOURCE: Federal collections from Annual Report(s) of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
State collections from Bureau of the Census, State Tax Collections.
aSincestate income tax collections include both the individual and corporate tax, the computation
is based on state and federal collections from both taxes.
bIncludesDistrict of Columbia.
Despite these limitations, the computed percentage relationships
between state and federal income tax collections demonstrate a
striking variation in the relative weight of state income taxes, ex-
plained largely by differences in tax rates and personal exemptions.
Two-thirds of the states with relatively low state collections allow
the federal tax as a deduction for state income tax purposes. This,
however, is only a partial explanation of the variation in the
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productivity of state income taxes since about the same proportion
of relatively high-yield state taxes also allow this deduction.
These statistics illuminate the divergence in state attitudes toward
the personal income tax as a source of state revenue. Seventeen states
choose not to use the income tax and have held to this view even in
the last twenty years, when the pressure for revenue was great; two
choose to tax only income from intangibles; the remaining 29 states
employ broadly based taxes but employ them with varying degrees
of intensity, ranging from about 3 per cent of federal tax liabilities
in Missouri to over 25percent in Oregon. (The yield of the New
Hampshire and Tennessee taxes restricted to income from intangibles
is less than 2 per cent of federal collections.)
This divergence in state attitudes toward income taxation, quite
apart from the States' desire to preserve freedom of action with
respect to the structure of their respective income taxes, makes
impracticable some frequently proposed devices for federal-state
income tax coordination.
It has been suggested, for example, that the federal government
share a part of its individual income tax revenue with the states in
return for the states discontinuing their own income taxes. Such an
arrangement would necessarily have to be voluntary on the part of
all the 31 states since, in the absence of a constitutional amendment,
it could not be forced upon states and would probably be workable
only if elected by all the states. It follows that the sharing would have
to be on a scale adequate to reimburse the state, which currently is
making the most intensive use of this tax. Oregon, for example, with
individual income collections approximating one-quarter of
federal collections could not be expected voluntarily to surrender its
own tax for substantially less than a corresponding proportion of
federal income tax collections reported from that state. Since practical
political considerations would probably prescribe uniform sharing
with all the states,'3 it would require (at current federal collection
levels) an additional federal tax levy of the general magnitude of $10
billion to finance this coordination device. In other words, the federal
government would have to distribute to the states, on the average,
about $6 for every $1 of their own tax they abandoned. This is the
general magnitude of the federal cost of a sharing basis adequate to
Uniformtreatment of all the states is assumed to be one of the essential differences
between a shared tax and a grant-in-aid. In an exchange of state income taxes for a
federal grant, it would, of course, be possible to relate the amount of the grants to the
income tax revenues abandoned by the individual states.
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compensate fully every state for giving up its own individual income
tax. Inevitably most states would receive windfalls, relatively the
largest accruing to those which now impose no income taxes or
employ them at relatively very low effective tax rates. The largest
windfalls would accrue to the older industrial states without indivi-
dual income taxes.
Another coordination device occasionally suggested for possible
use in the individual income tax area is the tax supplement. It
involves the states imposing their taxes on the federal income tax
base and the federal government collecting them at the time it collects
its own tax. Each state would be free to determine its own tax rate,
expressed preferably as a percentage of the federal tax liability.
The tax supplement technique has had some acceptance in the joint
collection of state and local sales taxes, pioneered by Mississippi in
1950 and now in widespread use in California and Illinois, and to a
lesser degree, in New Mexico. The supplement differs from the use of
an identical tax base by two independent taxing jurisdictions discussed
below only in that the tax supplement involves one jurisdiction
collecting the taxes of both.
The applicability of the tax supplement to income taxation presents
difficulties quite apart from the reluctance of the states to surrender
the privilege of administering their own taxes. The federal taxpayer
can file his tax return and pay his taxes either at his place of residence
or his place of business. Whatever place he chooses, his tax return
must cover all his income wherever derived—in the state of filing, in
any of the other 48 states or in a foreign country. States generally
follow a similar rule; their residents are taxable on all their income,
from whatever geographic source. In the case of nonresidents,
however, states limit their jurisdiction to income originating within
their own borders. Use of the tax supplement for collecting state
income taxes from nonresidents would pose problems, because
federal administrative agencies would be reluctant to undertake the
determinations necessary to differentiate between income derived
within and without a state on the basis of varying state rules. For
this reason the tax supplement device would probably be practicable
only if the states abandoned the taxation of non residents.14
The tax supplement is closely akin to the utilization of similar tax
bases and methods of tax computation by two or more independent
Assuminguniveral state income taxation, this would leave the total income subject
to statC taxation unchanged, but would alter its distribution among the states.
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taxing jurisdictions. An advanced form of this coordination has been
proposed in New York. It contemplates the state utilizing the federal
provisions governing the definition of taxable income, subject only to
such adjustments as the state legislature prescribes. New York's
corporation franchise tax has long been geared to thefederal tax base.'5
Use of the federal tax base for state tax purposes can take several
forms depending upon the degree of coordination and simplification
desired. In its most complete form, the state tax is. simply expressed
as a percentage of the federal liability. The outstanding example is
the territorial income tax of Alaska imposed at 14 per cent of federal
tax liability. In this way Federal Revenue Code revisions affecting tax
liability were automatically applicable for purposes of the Alaskan
tax. Questions of constitutionality may be involved since it can be
interpreted as a delegation of state legislative powers to the Congress.
New Mexico avoided the constitutional question by making the use
of this device optional. Between 1953 and 1955 it gave its taxpayers
(with adjusted gross incomes under $10,000) a choice between 4 per
cent of Federal tax liability and liability computed under New
Mexico's own tax law.
A second possibility is for the state to utilize the federal definition
of taxable net income under current law, to which its own independ-
ently determined tax rates apply. Alternatively,thestate may
employ the federal definition of taxable income as of a certain date,
disregarding subsequent changes in the Federal Code.
State use of federal definitions of taxable income is not untried.
Between 1953 and 1955 Utah's taxpayers with adjusted gross income
under $5,000 were permitted to compute their taxes either on the
basis of the Utah statute or on the basis of federal taxable income
reduced by the amount of federal income tax paid. Currently,
Vermont taxpayers have the option to employ definitions under the
Federal Revenue Code in effect on April 26, 1957. Kentucky permits
its taxpayers to compute their tax on the basis of the Federal Code
in effect on January 1, 1956. Iowa bases its tax on the 1954 Code as
enacted(disregardingsubsequent amendments).Specificallyit
defines net income for Iowa state purposes as adjusted gross income
under the 1954 Code (plus interest from municipal bonds and Iowa
income taxes deducted on the federal tax return, and minus interest
and dividends from federal securities).
15PeterMiller, "Proposal for a Federally Based New York Personal Income Tax,"
Tax LawReview,January 1958, pp. 183—209.
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Adoption of federal definitions of the tax base for purposes of the
states' taxes would simplify the preparation of tax returns and state
enforcement of the tax laws. Presumably it would involve some loss
of revenue to the states since their own statutes do not generally
provide as many exceptions to the general rule (for the benefit of
selected groups of taxpayers) as does the Federal Code. This revenue
loss could possibly be more than offset, however, by the increased
revenue the states could derive by capitalizing on the results of the
more effective federal tax enforcement.
In the interest of completeness, mention should be made of the
widespread and growing practice of state legislatures to adopt
Federal Code provisions pertaining to one or more details in the
computation of tax liability for purposes of their own taxes. Capital
gains and losses and loss carryover provisions are examples.
In terms of national aggregates and in relation to federal tax
magnitudes, state income taxes would appear to have substantial
potential for expansion. The deductibility of state taxes for federal
income tax purposes contributes to this potential, since it shifts a
part of the increased state tax burdens from the taxpayer to the
federal government. In effect, the federal treasury absorbs a share
of the burden of any increase in the state tax (of a taxpayer who
itemizes deductions) corresponding to the marginal federal tax rate
applicable to the taxpayer in the absence of the increased deduction.
An extreme example of this approach was rejected by the California
electorate in November 1958.16 The threat of driving residents and
their activities to other low income tax states effectively inhibits
movement in this direction, although experience appears to lend little
credence to the argument that variations in tax rates significantly
influence decisions concerning the location of industries.
C. CORPORATION INCOME TAX
The corporate income tax generally occupies a prominent place
in the list of overlapping taxes but has not figured prominently
among coordination proposals. It has on occasions been singled out
for such proposed arrangements as revenue sharing but few appear
to regard it a pressing problem.
Corporate net income is now taxed in 34 states and the District of
16Proposedconstitutional amendment (Proposition 17) which would have reduced
the sales tax and the lower range income tax rates and substantially increased tax
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Columbia and produces about $1 billion annually for the states.
This represents about 6.6 per cent of state tax collections and less
than 4 per cent of combined state and local tax collections. It is
equivalent to about two-thirds of the revenues the states derive from
individual income taxes.
Most (31) of the state corporate income taxes predate World War
II; nearly half of them (15) came into existence during the depressed
1930's; only 2 states (Delaware and New Jersey) joined the ranks
during the present decade, both in 1958. Recent years have witnessed,
however, extensive legislative activity in states with established
corporate income taxes to increase revenues, frequently through rate
increases.
The rate structure of the states' corporate taxes are summarized in
Table 5 above. Most states (28) and the District of Columbia employ
flat rates; six impose graduated rates. The flat-rate state taxes range
from 1.75 per cent in New Jersey and 2 per cent in Iowa, Missouri,
and New Mexico, to 8 per cent in Idaho. Five per cent rates are most
frequent. Of the six graduated rate structures, Kentucky uses only
two brackets and differentiates, as the federal government, at $25,000
of net income. Arkansas and Mississippi employ five brackets in
their rate structure, the maximum rate applying to the excess over
$25,000. Arizona and Wisconsin employ seven brackets and North
Dakota four (Table 5).
In relation to the federal tax, the weight of the overlapping state
taxes is moderate. In the 32 states which taxed corporate income
during the six years, 1953—58, state revenues averaged about 6.9
per cent of federal corporate income tax collections and in the
aggregate now equal about 2 1/2 percentage points of the federal
tax rate. The net cost of state taxes to corporations, allowing for the
deductibility of state taxes for federal tax purposes, was of the general
magnitude of about 1 1/2 percentage points of the federal tax rate.
This is one measure of the extent to which state corporate income
taxes overlap the federal tax (Table 6).
On the basis of federal tax returns filed in 1955—56, the states with
corporate income taxes accounted for 66 per cent of all corporations
filing federal income tax returns, for 61 per cent of these corporations'
reported net income and for 60 per cent of their federal income tax
liability. The two new state taxes enacted in 1958 raise these respective
percentages by about five points. About 28 per cent of corporations
with net income, accounting for one-third of all corporate net income
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and federal tax liability, have their main offices in one of the fourteen
states without a corporate net income tax. Some of these corporations,
however, pay income taxes in one or more additional states since they
derive income from them.
The obstacles to replacing the 34 state corporation income taxes
with a share of the federal government's collections from this source
are akin to those discussed above with reference to the individual
income tax, but are here found in a more exaggerated form. They
TABLE 6
Federal and State Corporation Income Tax




YEAR FEDERAL Amount Federal
1953 $21,238 $817 3.85
1954 21,101 778 3.69
1955 17,861 744 4.17
1956 20,880 890 4.26
1957 21,167 984 4.65
1958 20,074 981 4.89
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Summary of Government
Finances. The 1956—58 totals exclude local collections which
averaged $7 million in the earlier years.
stem from the uneven use the states make of this tax. Fourteen do not
tax corporate net income. The other 34 states have relatively similar
tax structures and employ tax rates of the same general magnitude
(largely concentrated within the 4 per cent to 6 per cent rate range)
but the revenue produced varies widely both in relation to the
states' total tax revenues and more particularly in relation to federal
revenues. In 1958 the corporate income tax supplied 17.2 per cent
of New York's but only 1.3 per cent of Iowa's tax collections.
The evaluation of the relative weight of the states' corporate
income taxes in terms of the federal tax presents even more difficulties
than in the individual income tax area (Tables 7 and 8). The tabula-
tion of federal collections by states is based on federal returns filed
and taxes collected. Corporations typically file a single federal tax
return at their headquarters or principal place of business, although
a substantial number of them derive income in more than one state.
Because their main offices are generally in urban industrial areas,
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TABLE 7
Corporation Income Tax: State Collections as a Percentage of Federal
Collections, Fiscal Years 1953—58
FISCAL YEARS
STATE 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 19581953—58
Alabamaa 5.5 5.3 6.0 7.9 8.3 7.8 6.9
Arizonaa 6.6 7.6 7.9 10.1 9.0 6.5 7.9
Arkansas 22.5 23.7 22.8 24.5 31.4 31.6 25.8
California 10.3 10.4 12.4 12.6 13.1 14.6 12.2
Colorado 4.2 4.7 5.3 4.8 3.4 8.9 5.2
Connecticut 5.2 6.0 7.5 8.6 8.9 9.3 7.5
Georgia 7.5 7.2 7.2 10.7 11.5 10.5 9.2
Idaho 14.0 14.2 11.1 16.2 20.4 18.6 15.5
Iowa 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.2
Kansas 2.1 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.8 5.2 3.3
Kentucky 6.3 5.5 7.9 7.7 10.5 11.4 8.2
LQuisianaa 4.6 4.2 4.8 5,6 5.9 5.8 5.2
Marylandb 8.5 7.2 8.9 11,5 10.3 11.8 9.6
Massachusettse 4.5 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.8 6.2 54
Minnesota 5.4 4.7 5.8 6.5 6.6 8.3 6.2
Mississippi 33.9 45.4 49.2 41.1 46.5 48.0 43.8
Missouria 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.5
Montana 6.9 8.6 7.1 12.8 10.2 10.3 9,4
New Mexicoa 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.4
New York 4.4 4.0 4.5 4.2 4.6 4.9 4.4
North Carolina 14.3 14.8 16.1 16.3 16.1 16.8 15.8
North Dakota 11.6 12.3 12.3 15.2 14.7 13.1 13.2
Oklahoma 4.6 4.7 5.2 5.4 5.6 6.1 5.3
Oregon 18.7 19.0 19.2 17.0 22.8 35.3 21.5
Pennsylvania 9.4 7.7 8.4 9.3 11.5 10.1 9.4
Rhode Island 8.7 9.0 9.8 11.3 10.7 11.7 10.1
South Carolina 18.5 19.3 17.8 24.2 24.5 23.1 21.2
Tennessee 12.4 13.6 13.6 11.2 14.3 14.9 13.3
Utah 8.3 11.4 7.0 9.2 19.9 13.8 11.8
Vermont 11.2 9.2 11.0 14.7 15.9 18.1 12.7
Virginia 9.2 11.5 12.4 13.0 11.7 11.5 11.5
Wisconsin 10.4 11.8 12.7 12.9 13.2 13.5 12.3
Total 32 States 6.3 6.0 6.7 7.1 7.6 7.9 6.9
Total (U.S.) 3.9 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.9 5.1 4.4
Caution: These data are subject to important limitations and the reader is urged to
consider the qualifications noted in the accompanying text in interpreting them.
SOURCE: Federal collections from Annual Repor(s) of theCommissionerof Internal
Revenue. State collections from Bureau of the Census, State Tax Collections.
aSincethe state income tax collections include both the individual and the corporate
tax, the computation is based on combined federal and state collections from both taxes.
bIncludesDistrict of Columbia.
CStatecollections do not include corporation excise taxes and surtaxes measured in
part by net income and in part by corporate excess, which are classified as licenses.
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TABLE 8
Corporation Income Tax: State Collections as a Percentage of











Iowa 2.2 Alabama6 6.9 California 12.2 Arkansas 25.8
Kansas 3.3 Arizona6 7.9 North Dakota13.2 Idaho 15.5
Missouri6 2.5 Colorado 5.2 Rhode Island 10.1 Mississippi 43.8
New Mexicoa4.4 Connecticut 7.5 Tennessee 13.3 North Carolina15.8























states 5 13 8 6
Caution: These data are subject to important limitations and the reader is urged to consider the
qualifications noted in the accompanying text in interpreting them.
SouRcE: Federal collections from Annual Report(s)of the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue.
State collections from Bureau of the Census, State Tax Collections.
aSincestate income tax collections include both the individual and the corporate tax, the compu-
tation is based on federal and state collections from both taxes.
b State collections do not include corporation excise taxes and surtaxes measured in part by net
income and in part by corporate excess, which are classified as licenses.
CIncludesDistrict of Columbia.
federal tax collection statistics understate the contribution of the
nonindustrial and noncommercial states.
Since the states invariably tax all income derived within their
borders, the less industrialized jurisdictions generally derive a large
share of their corporate tax revenue from nonresident corporations
which pay their federal taxes in another state. In consequence, the
ratio of state to federal collections generally exaggerates the relative
weight of state taxes in rural sections, and undervalues it in indus-
trialized states. As Table 7 indicates, the ratio of state to federal
collections (1958) is highest in Mississippi (48 per cent) where the
corporate tax structure is not materially different from that of the
other states. It will be noted that its ratio of state to federal collections
has been consistently high over the years. This suggests that a large
share of Mississippi's tax revenue is attributable to corporations
which file their federal returns outside the state. This explanation
may apply also to Arkansas. In Oregon, on the other hand, the high
percentage (35.3percent) may in part be explained by high rates.
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While the ratio of state to federal corporation income tax collec-
tions is not a meaningful measure of the absolute weight of a state's
tax, it is indicative of the relative weight of the tax in comparable
states. The existence of wide interstate variations is compelling with
regard to the proposal that the states exchange their taxes for a share
of federal corporate income tax revenues. During 1953—58, it would
have required about 40 per cent of federal collections in Mississippi to
compensate that state for giving up its own corporate tax. A sharing
on this scale with all of the states would have produced large windfalls
for all other states and entailed a vast cost to the federal treasury.
A noteworthy feature of federal-state corporate tax relations is
the growing reliance of the states on the tax base computed for
federal income tax purposes. Significantly, all three state taxes
enacted since World War II (Rhode Island in 1947, Delaware and
New Jersey in 1958) base their own tax on income computed for
federal tax purposes. This is the practice in seven other states as well.
The adjustments made in the federal tax base are relatively few.
Each of the states requires that state income taxes excluded from the
federal base be added back and that interest on federal obligations
included for federal purposes be subtracted. Only two of the ten
states (Iowa and Kentucky) which employ the federal tax base
allow the federal income tax as a deduction. In fifteeii of the remain-
ing twenty-four states the deductibility of the federal income tax
reduces the base of the state corporate income tax by nearly half.
The states' reliance on federal definitions of taxable income, coupled
with some standardization of rules for allocating multistate income
among the participating states, has appreciably eased the compliance
burdens of corporate taxpayers.17
D. ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAXES'8
A major performer on the stage of intergovernmental tax relations
is the tax on the transfer of property at death. The taxation of such
property transfers either to the estate or to the heirs of the decedent
has a long history, as do the efforts to bring order into federal-state
relationships in this tax area.
Recentdevelopments in the allocation of multistate income among the states
merit more than passing reference but fall outside the scope of a paper concerned with
federal-state relations.
The gift tax, an integral part of the federal property transfer tax system, is not
treated here. Twelve states now have gift taxes which collectively produced less than
$7 million in 1958.
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Inheritance and estate taxes are typically state, as distinguished
from local levies, although a number of states share some of these
revenues with local governments. Over the years, largely as a result
of rising property values, the annual yield of this state tax source has
risen. Collections aggregated $344 million in 1958 and $340 million
in 1957, compared with $168 million in 1950 and $244 million in
1955. These totals include state imposed taxes retained by local
jurisdictions in ten states (about $10 miffion in 1957).
In most of the states the institution of a tax on transfers of property
at death was well established when, in 1916, the Congress enacted
what proved to be a permanent estate tax. Similar impositions (1798
to 1802; 1861 to 1870; 1898 to 1902) associated with earlier national
crises were retained only temporarily.
Objections to the entry of the federal government into a tax area
pre-empted by the states and a simultaneous concern for the survival
of state taxes in the face of overt interstate tax competition for
wealthy residents stimulated the invention in 1924 of the credit
against the federal estate tax for inheritance and estate taxes paid to
the states. At first the credit was limited to 25 per cent of federal
tax liability but in 1926 was raised to 80 per cent. This enabled the
states, through appropriate legislation, to have in effect death taxes
as high as 80 per cent of federal tax liability without adding to the net
tax burden of their taxpayers. Within this limit state taxes merely
pre-empted revenues which otherwise would be payable to the federal
government. The credit provision was interpreted by many as
congressional consent to share with the states the revenue yield of
death taxes approximately in the ratio of 20 per cent federal and
80 per cent state.
Subsequent federal tax developments altered this relationship. In
successive efforts to increase federal revenues the estate tax exemption
was reduced (1932, 1935, 1942) and tax rates increased (1932, 1934,
1935, 1941), while the amount of credit remained geared to liabilities
under the 1926 Act. This reduced the ratio of the state credit to
federal tax liability in proportion to the increase in the latter.'9
Today the relative importance of the credit is least in the brackets
where the post-1926 increases in tax liability were greatest; it is
relatively largest where the increase in federal tax has been relatively
19Theadoption by the federal government of the marital deduction in 1948 left the
relationship of the maximum credit to federal tax liability unchanged, but reduced its
dollar value by reducing the size of the taxable estate which determines the size of the
credit.
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TABLE 9
Credit for State Death Taxes as a Percentage of Federal Estate Tax
Liability, Returns Filed During 1957













60—80 — 4,296 .-
80—100 — 16,890 —
100—150 439 68,406 0.6
150-200 2,428 71,393 3.4
200—300 5,815 120,570 4.8
300—400 5,891 88,452 6.7
400-500 .5,633 72,617 7.8
500—600 5,056 58,906 8.6
600—700 4,543 49,514 9.2
700—800 3,596 36,815 9.8
800—900 4,002 38,902 10.3
900—1,000 3,115 28,621 10.9
1,000—2,000 25,377 200,395 12.7
2,000—3,000 13,521 94,233 14.3
3,000—4,000 7,758 50,809 15.3







10,000—20,000 11,932 62,811 19.0
20,000 or more 22,643 110,824 . 20.4
Total taxable returns 146,769 1,323,417 11.1
SOURCE: Internal Revenue Service, Statisrics of Income, 1956.
aBeforestate but after other tax credits.
smallest. The state credit varies from zero on net estates below
$100,000 and from less than 1 per cent of gross federal tax liability
on net estates between $100,000 and $150,000, to 20 per cent on net
estates above $20 million (Table 9).
In fiscal year 1957, the credit allowed for death taxes paid to states
aggregated about $147 million, or approximately 11 per cent of
federal estate tax liability (before the state credits). An approxi-
mately 10 per cent relationship between the credit for state taxes and
federal tax liability has prevailed for more than a dozen years, a
period of stability in federal estate tax rates. For several years
preceding 1932, the credit approximated 75 per cent of federal tax
liability (Table 10).
As a result of the dissatisfaction of the states with their reduced
share of this revenue, the terms of federal-state relations in the death
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TABLE 10







YEAR DEATH TAX CREDIT8 Amount Credit
1929 $165,414 $122,110 73.8
1930 152,391 113,388 74.4
1931 182,202 137,663 75.6
1932 84,006 61,642 73.4
1933 87,725 28,295 32.3
1934 129,053 33,769 26.2
1935 197,664 43,864 22.2
1936 239,486 44,218 18.5
1937 364,018 58,252 16.0
1938 374,230 59,842 16.0
1939 329,202 53,111 16.1
1940 295,654 45,337 15.3
1941 345,342 53,636 15.5
1942 353,933 45,626 12.9
1943 398,120 35,966 9.0
1944 450,888 46,285 10.3
1945 595,562 64,517 10.8
1946 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1947 691,817 69,850 10.1
1948 797,432 82,725 10.4
1949 633,250 65,831 10.4
1950 532,459 48,940 9.2
1951 641,935 64,535 10.1
1952 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1953 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1954 864,346 85,842 9.9
1955 864,591 86,249 10.0
1956 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1957 1,323,479 146,769 11.1
SOURCE: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income.
aAfterother credits.
n.a. =notavailable.
tax area have been reviewed with much frequency, if not regularity.
Resolutions on the subject have become a standard feature of
gatherings of state officials. The inheritance-estate taxes have become
a symbol of the need for federal-state tax coordination eqtirely out of
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proportion tothecontribution—less than 2 per cent—they make to
the revenues of all governments in the United States.
In fiscal year 1957 about 40 per cent of the $340 million collected
by state and local governments from inheritance and estate taxes
was offset as a credit against federal tax; the remaining 60 per cent
did not qualify for the credit. These are national averages and
submerge' wide interstate differences. In the five states where the
state tax is limited to and determined by the maximum credit allowed
under present federal law, about 100 per cent of the state tax qualifies
by definition for the credit. In the remaining states this percentage
falls below 100 per cent, depending upon the degree to which the
state-imposed tax exceeds the allowable credit. In some states, only
about a fourth (possibly even less) of the state tax appears to be
offset by a credit against the federal tax. In these cases state-imposed
taxes are, on the average, about four times as large as the maximum
credit allowed under federal law.
To increase their revenues from this source, states have lowered
exemptions, imposed taxes on small estates exempt from federal tax
or ineligible for a credit, and raised their tax rates in excess of the
maximum credit. The resulting structure is characterized by much
diversity. Several types of death taxes are in use. The simplest of
these are the five estate taxes (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
and Georgia) which correspond precisely to 80 per cent of tax
liability under the 1926 federal law. Two other states (Mississippi
and New York) also have estate taxes which are patterned on the
1926 federal law but depart from it in significant detail. Mississippi
retains tax rates corresponding to 80 per cent of the 1926 federal
rates, but uses a $60,000 (in lieu of a $100,000) exemption. It imposes
also a temporary surtax equal to 14 per cent of liability under its
permanent tax. New York's rates are 25 per cent in excess of the
allowable credit. Its exemption varies with the relationship of the
heirs to the decedent and is deductible from the first taxable bracket.
Five other states (North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and Utah) also have estate taxes but their rate and exemption struc-
tures bear no resemblance to federal law (Table 11).
Three-fourths of the states (37) employ inheritance taxes with
diverse rates and exemptions, but all except two of these (Oregon and
West Virginia) also have "pick-up" estate taxes which absorb any
part of the allowable credit left unused by the inheritance tax.
Oregon supplements its inheritance tax with an independent estate
161TABLE 11
Types of State Death Taxes
Inheritance
State Tax


































New Hampshire X X
New Jersey X X
New Mexico X X
New York X X






Rhode Island X X X











Total 38 7 5 38
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tax and West Virginia's inheritance tax rates are so high that tax
liability in almost all situations exceeds the maximum credit. There
are important interstate variations also in the structural features of
state death taxes, especially in deductions allowed in determining
the net estate. A fourth of the states (13) for example, allow a marital
deduction for property passing to the surviving spouse, and half
allow the federal estate tax to be deducted in determining the amount
of the taxable estate for state tax purposes.
Since the inheritance and estate tax affects relatively few tax-
payers, it is a tax area which arouses relatively little public interest.
Proposals for coordination and more particularly for increasing the
states' share of revenues have emanated largely from state officials,
scholars and tax practitioners. Some are concerned primarily with
increasing the states' revenues; others with tax simplification for the
benefit of taxpayers and tax administrators.
Coordination Proposals
The most frequent proposal for increasing the states' share of
death tax revenues is to raise the credit allowed against federal tax
liability for taxes paid to states. It is commonly supported by the
argument that the Congress is obligated to honor the 1926 principle
which earmarked approximately 80 per cent of this revenue for the
states.
It is not generally understood that an increase in the credit would
not automatically increase the revenues of the great majority of the
states; that for many states it would be difficult to benefit from the
higher credit and the net result would be federal tax reduction.
As noted above, state imposed death taxes generally exceed the
maximum credit allowed against federal tax. In the five recent years
for which data are available, the credit claimed on federal estate tax
returns represented 34 per cent of state inheritance and estate tax
collections. In other words, the average estate could claim only $1 of
credit against federal tax for every $3 it paid in state taxes. This
relationship, however, varies widely among the states (Table 12)
reflecting interstate variations in tax burdens. It varies also between
different size estates within any one state. It follows that an increase
in the credit would, in the first instance, enable the estate to take a
credit against federal tax for a larger share of taxes paid to the states
than hitherto (even though the state tax remained unchanged).
Net federal tax liability and federal revenues would be reduced but
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TABLE 12
Credit for Inheritance and Estate Taxes Claimed on Federal Estate Tax
Returns as a Percentage of State Estate and Inheritance Tax Collections




25 Per Cent to
50 Per Cent




Colorado 16.3 California 32.1 Alabama64.4Arkansas 80.4
Idaho 16.1 Connecticut 37.8 Arizona 70.7Florida 86.9
Indiana 17.1 Delaware 31.6 Georgia 73.4Nebraska 159.3
Iowa 7.0 Illinois 45.6New York56.4South Carolina81.8


















New Hampshire21.4 Missouri 36.2
North Dakota18.5 New Jersey 27.1 .
Oklahoma 21.0 New Mexico 26.9
Oregon 17.1 North Carolina25.4
Pennsylvania 22.1 Rhode Island 44.3
South Dakota 13.8 Virginia 49.9






21 16 6 4
SOURcE: Credits claimed from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income; State collections
from Bureau of the Census, State Tax Collections.
aThesepercentages provide only an approximate indication of the share of state taxes claimed as
credit on federal returns because they are based on unaudited federal returns. Audited returns would
show a larger federal tax liability with a corresponding increase in the maximum limitation on the
credit. On the other hand, however, these computations are based on state tax collections oniy
(excluding local) and in ten states (notably in Nebraska, Ohio, Illinois, and North Dakota) a part of
state taxes is retained by local jurisdictions and is not included in state revenues.
would not be offset by increased state liability. State tax liabilities
and revenues would be increased only to the extent that the increased
credit was accompanied by state tax increases. This poses difficulties
except in the very few states whose present taxes are limited to the
credit and include "pick-up" provisions which would operate
automatically if the credit limitation were raised.
An increase in the federal credit for taxes paid to states could take
several forms, depending upon the objective sought. It is possible,
for example, to leave the credit tied to the 1926 federal rate and
exemption structure and raise the 80 per cent limitation to 100 per
cent or more of the federal tax liability calculated under that structure.
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This could be accomplished by appropriate adjustment in the credit
schedule which the Congress in 1954 converted into equivalents
of the current federal estate tax rates (Section 2011). An increase in
the credit limitation to 100 per cent of 1926 liabilities would, in each
case, raise the credit by 25 per cent; an increase to 200 per cent of
those liabilities would raise it by 150 per cent, etc. Such proportionate
increases in the credit would perpetuate all current variations in the
relationship of the credit to federal tax liability among estates of
different size. In other words, it would continue to deny any credit
to net estates under $100,000, and, in all other cases, would increase
the credit in the same ratio. As a result, the relative importance of
the credit to federal tax liability would continue to increase as the
size of the estate increases. The handful of states whose present taxes
are determined by and limited to the maximum credit, would auto-
matically raise their own taxes to pick up the exact increase in the
credit. All other states, whose taxes exceed the present credit, would
be free to choose between passing all of the increased credit to the
benefit of their taxpayers or adjusting their rate structure (possibly
through a "pick-up" tax) with a view to retaining it for the benefit
of state revenues. Because the details of state tax structures typically
vary substantially from the structure of the federal estate tax, that
objective could at best only be approximated, and would necessarily
entail net tax reductions for some taxpayers and net tax increases
for others.2°
Another possibility is to leave the present credit unchanged and
to supplement it with a second credit based on net federal tax liability
under current law. The credit would in each instance be increased in
proportion to federal tax liabilities. This not only would perpetuate
the complexity inherent in the 1926 rate structure, but also would
aggravate it by superimposing an additional, albeit relatively simple,
credit computation. Since the difference between tax liabilities under
the 1926 and the current federal tax structure is relatively largest at the
lower end of the rate schedule, this would increase the credit for
small estates relatively more than for large estates. States could appro-
priate the increased credit for the benefit of their tax collections by
enacting an additional pick-up tax measured by an appropriate
20Thecredit is a function of federal tax liability and bears no uniform relationship
to state tax liability. For this reason, it is not possible to adjust state tax rates so as to
increase the tax liability of each estate by an amount exactly equal to the increase in
the federal credit, unless each state enacted an additional pick-up tax measured (for
each estate) by the excess of the new credit over the old.
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percentage of net federal tax liabilities, with attendant further
complexities.
A third alternative is to scrap the present credit entirely and replace
it with one based on current federal tax liabilities. It would require
a credit equal to 20 per cent of gross federal tax liability to double
the revenue significance of the present credit. The relative increase in
credit would be greatest for small estates and would decline gradually
as the size of the estate increased. Since, however, federal tax liability
varies both in relation to the 1926 credit and state tax burdens, some
states would experience great difficulty in matching the increased
federal credit with an increase in state liabilities. None could achieve
it completely; only approach it approximately. This arrangement,
however, would ease taxpayers' compliance and tax administration
problems by displacing the present credit calculations which vary
bracket by bracket, with one consisting of a constant percentage of
federal tax liability.
Technically, it is possible also to vary a credit based on federal tax
liability with the size of the taxable estate, or bracket by bracket.
A proposal advanced years ago would have allowed a 100 per cent
credit up to $100,000 of taxable estate and 20 per cent on the balance.
Such variations would add to the complexity of the credit computation
and, depending upon the extent of the differentiation, would affect
the relative importance of the credit for different size estates.
A favorite proposal of some state officials is that the federal
government surrender the estate tax field for the exclusive use of
the states. They support it on the grounds that the transfer of property
at death is a privilege controlled by state law, that states provide for
the administration of estates and were first to develop estate taxes,
and that they have a relatively greater need for revenue than the
federal government. The opponents point out that private wealth is
derived, for the most part, through interstate commerce fostered by
national programs and policies, that a transfer tax limited to
the state of domicile of the decedent or the situs of the property
would discriminate against other states which contributed to the
creation of wealth, and that State taxation alone would enable
the wealthy industrial states to monopolize an unduly large share of
the revenue. It is feared also that if the tax were reserved for the
states, their revenue take would only be temporary because com-
petitive tax reductions would soon be revived.
Advocates of tax simplification suggest the reverse of the above
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proposal: that the states surrender this tax area to the federal govern-
thent in return for an appropriate share of federal collections. They
point to the multistate origin of family fortunes. This suggestion,
however, elicits little sympathy from those who regard this to be
historically a state tax.
Since the states currently obtain about $350 miffion of revenue
from death taxes and desire to increase it substantially, they could
be expected to be willing to give them up only on terms entailing
a sizable net revenue cost to the federal treasury. Present state death
tax revenues correspond to about 25 per cent of federal estate tax
liabilities before credits for state taxes. In other words, they exceed
the credits allowed by about $200 million a year. However, sub-
stantially more than 25 per cent of federal liabilities would be
required to compensate the states for the revenue they would forego
by abandoning their own levies, if distributions among the states
were based on state of origin of federal collections.
States typically obtain a large part of their revenue from small
estates which are either entirely exempt from federal tax or are
subject to relatively low rates. While theoretically the federal tax
take from this group of estates could be increased to replace state
taxes, practical administrative considerations would militate against
such a course. Moreover, since federal taxes are necessarily uniform
in all 48 states, the substitution of a federal tax for the several state
taxes would significantly alter the tax burdens on small estates.
In those states which now limit their death tax to the credit allowed
under federal law, any increase in federal tax would represent an
increased tax burden; in the states with relatively very heavy state
taxes, the substitution of an increased federal tax would not prevent
some tax reductions.
A significant change in burdens would be an inescapable con-
sequence of substituting a uniform federal tax for diverse state taxes,
irrespective of whether an effort were made to recoup part of the
federal cost by increasing federal tax rates. This would prevail even if
federal revenues were distributed among the states in proportion to
the states' own collections, rather than shared on the basis of the
origin of federal collections.
Still another possibility is to divide the death tax area among the
states and the federal government, giving the states exclusive tax
jurisdiction over small and medium sized estates and the federal
government over large estates. What is a "large estate" would
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presumably be determined by the amount of the revenue it is desired
to leave with the federal government. If, for example, the federal
government exempted from estate taxation all net estates below
$500,000 (but retained the present specific exemption for those above
this level), net federal estate tax liabilities would be reduced by about
$315 million (at 1955 estate tax levels). If, in return, the federal
government were relieved of the need to grant credits for taxes paid
to states on returns subject to federal tax (above $500,000, exempted
from state taxes) net federal tax liabilities on those estates would be
increased by $70 million, resulting in a net revenue loss of approxi-
mately $250 million. This is a measure of the initial cost to the federal
treasury of a division at the $500,000 level (at 1955 estate tax levels);
not necessarily the ultimate cost.2'
Since present state taxes on large estates frequently exceed the
maximum credit allowed under present law, the exemption of these
estates from state taxes would result in a corresponding reduction
in the tax burden borne by them. An upward adjustment in federal
rates to offset such reductions would reduce the federal cost below
the $250 million level. This, however, would involve a tax increase
for estates in those few states where the state tax above the $500,000
net estate level does not exceed the present federal credit.
Under this kind of federal-state division, the states would be left
with complete tax autonomy with respect to smaller estates, while
the federal government would be left with exclusive jurisdiction over
the taxation of large estates, which presumably are likely to have
multistate origins and in that respect provide a more appropriate
basis for federal than for state taxation. To the extent inheritance
and estate tax considerations are of relatively secondary importance
in the case of small estates, the states would be free to shape their
tax policies without fear of interstate tax competition for wealthy
residents.
Under this division, the number of taxable federal, estate tax
returns would be reduced by more than 90 per cent (from 30,000 to
about 2,000 at 1956 estate tax levels). The administrative task of the
states might be increased, since they would be of such assist-
ance as they now obtain from access to valuations and related data
available in the Internal Revenue Service. In other respects, however,
21Sincethe number and size of large estates can vary widely from year to year, a
similar calculation based on another year's returns would probably show a different
result.
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the states' administrative task would be eased. They would be freed
of the specialized problems typically associated with large estates,
such as the valuation of contingent interests, especially complex
under inheritance taxes since it is not certain at the time the tax is
determined to how many beneficiaries and to what class of bene-
ficiaries these interestswill pass. Taxpayers' and practitioners'
burdens would be eased by the division of this tax area on the basis
of the size of the estate, since each estate would be subject to either
federal or state taxes, not to both.22
E. EXCISE TAXES
Since World War II, a widespread point of view has developed
with respect to the handling of sales and excise taxes in the rearrange-
ment of federal-state tax relations: that the federal government
relinquish those suitable for state or local administration for ex-
clusive use by these governments. State and local governments are
agreed that the federal government should relinquish them. Local
governments add the qualification that the states, too, should re-
linquish them; that excises so relinquished be reserved for exclusive
local use. In two or three recent instances, the federal government
has moved in the direction urged by the states but this has contributed
little, if at all, to the solution of their problems.
The federal taxes most frequently selected for transfer to state/local
governments are these:
TABLE 13
Federal Excises Proposed for Transfer to the States
Collections, fy. 1958




Local telephone service 371
Sales of electrical energy a
Club dues andinitiation fees 60
Coin operated devices 18
Bowling alleys, pooi tables 3
Safety deposit box rentals 6
Total 3,817
SOURCE: The Budge: of the U.S. for Fiscal Year 1960,
Special Analysis B, pp. 933—9.
aRepealedin 1951 when it yielded about $100 million.
22TheSecond Report of the Joint Federal-State Action Committee, December 1958,
pp. 32—44,containsestimates of the effect of alternative increases in the credit for state
death taxes on federal revenues and the state-by-state distribution of credits.
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It is argued in support of the transfer of excises to the states that
the federal government can dispense with them because its needs can
be met from income taxation, while state-local governments, pre-
cluded from intensive use of income taxes, necessarily rely heavily
on consumer taxes. Local governments see in some excise taxes an
opportunity to supplement local property taxes without encountering
intercommunity competition. In motor fuel taxation, the states base
their claim on historical priority in the field and on their responsibility
for building and maintaining streets and highways.
Spokesmen for the federal government have on at least one
occasion (1949) accepted this objective conditionally "when bud-
getary conditions permit." Since federal budgetary conditions have
rarely been propitious, such federal taxes as have been relinquished
were picked without specific relationship to the objective of increasing
the taxing resources of state and local governments. The proposal
to transfer federal revenue sources to the states has recently been
infused with fresh blood by the recommendation of the Joint Federal-
State Action Committee to trade the states' tax sources for federal
grant-in-aid programs.
Motor Fuel
The outstanding example of a federal excise coveted by the states is
the gasoline tax. During the immediate postwar years, proposals for
repeal of the federal gasoline tax had been frequent. Originally
introduced in 1932 as a depression emergency revenue measure, this
tax had remained in continuous use at rates of one to two cents per
gallon for 25 years.
Repeal of the federal tax has had strong support from the states,
the petroleum industry, highway organizations, and some members
of Congress. While the imposition of the tax coincided with a sub-
stantialfederal highway aid program, federaladministrations
regularly went to great lengths to explain that the two were unrelated;
that gasoline was taxed for general revenue purposes and the size
of the highway program was determined by need and not the yield
of this tax. In 1953, advocates of repeal combined that proposal with
the recommendation to discontinue federal grants for highways
except to those states which would lose by it. Three years later, in
the context of a concerted Administration effort to greatly improve
and enlarge the nation's highway network, jurisdictional claims to
the gasoline tax were removed from the arena of debate. The federal
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government relinquished use of the gasoline tax for general fund
purposes and reserved it for the highway trust fund, to be expended
through the states' highway departments. The Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1956 increased the tax rate from two cents to three cents per
gallon, and together with the yield of some other automotive taxes,
earmarked its proceeds for the Highway Trust Fund, reserved for
financing an expanded, long-range highway program.23 This assured
the states collectively that the proceeds of a three cent tax were theirs
to spend for highway construction, over and above the proceeds of
their own taxes. Had the federal tax been repealed, its revenue
equivalent would have been available for highway construction only
to the extent that each state legislature made a corresponding increase
in its own tax rate.
By relinquishing the gasoline tax (together with the new tax on
tread rubber and the weight tax on trucks and buses, the revenue
from an increased tax on tires, and half of the revenue from the
increased tax on trucks and buses) from its general fund, the federal
government has provided financing for 90 per cent of the cost of the
enlarged interstate highway system. The states' highway financing
problems have been relieved, but not solved. Several, particularly
those with extensive mileage and relatively low-traffic loads, are
finding it difficult to match (in the ratio of 1: 9) their allocations
from the highway trust fund, and to finance their other highway
needs as well. During the past three years, ten states have raised their
own tax rates which now range from three cents per gallon in one
state to seven cents in ten, and other states are considering increases.
The average state rate is now six cents, not including local gasoline
taxes in seven states, typically at a one cent rate, but in a few cases
as high as three cents per gallon.
Electrical Energy
Another federal excise long desired by local governments was that
on the sale of electrical energy, originally imposed in 1932 at a 3 per
cent rate and increased to 3 1/3 per cent in 1940. Sales of electrical
energy, as other utility services, have long been taxed by state and
local governments. In the years following World War lithe Congress
was urged to repeal the federal tax because it was particularly suitable
for local collection. In 1951 the tax was repealed, not in response t o
231n his January 1959 Budget Message the President recommended an increase in
the gasoline tax rate from three cents to four and one-half cents.
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local governments' pleas, but to remove the discrimination against
private enterprise created by the tax exemption of electrical energy
sold by publicly owned plants. Since its repeal at the federal level,
state and local governments have shown little disposition to make
increased use of the tax—at least not on a scale comparable to what
the federal tax had been.
In 1956, the Municipal Finance Officers Association tallied some
215 separate municipal taxes on electrical utility gross receipts.24
However, it did not segregate their revenue yield from the revenue
produced by all utilities, which aggregated $98 miffion for gross
receipts taxes on all public utilities in 341 cities. Inspection of the
detailed data suggests that the cities may have collected as much as
$30 million from the gross receipts of electric utilities, as compared
with about $100 million produced by the federal tax on electrical
energy sales of privately owned power plants six years earlier, at the
time the tax was repealed.
Admissions
A timely illustration of local governments' failure to enter tax
areas vacated by the federal government is the admissions tax. This
tax area has long been sought by spokesmen for municipal govern-
ments, who have been seconded by those speaking for the states and
the professional associations.
In the years following the war, the federal admissions tax provided
nearly $400 million a year. The estimated yield is $30 million for the
fiscal year 1960. During the interval, the rate of the tax was cut from
20 to 10 per cent and the larger part of the tax base was eliminated by
increases in exemptions. Municipal taxation of amusements has been
unaffected by these developments. In 1955 approximately 200 cities
raised about $22 miffion from admissions taxes. The Municipal
Finance Officers Association reported that "the tax has been confined
to the same states in which it has been used in the past and has not
spread to other states despite a decline in federal admissions tax rates
from 20 per cent to 10 per cent that occurred in 1954. This is contrary
to expectations of advocates of this type of tax for municipalities.
It had been anticipated that the tax would be utilized more extensively
by municipalities if federal taxes were reduced or eliminated."25
24MunicipalFinance Officers Association, Municipal Nonproperty Taxes, 1956
Supplement to "Where Cities Get Their Money," p. 29.
25Ibid., p.20.
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Anticipating that cities would have difficulty in imposing admis-
sions taxes, the American Municipal Association suggested in 1952
that, in lieu of repeal, the federal government allow a credit for
locally imposed admissions taxes. This suggestion received little
consideration from a Congress interested in relieving a depressed
industry; that objective would not have been served by a credit for
local taxes.
Cigarettes
The cigarette tax now produces about $1.7 billion of federal
revenue, approximately $200 million for each one cent of tax.
Cigarettes are taxed also by state and local governments. In 1958, state
revenues from tobacco products (mostly cigarettes), aggregated about
$600 million; local revenues, an additional $50 million.
Cigarettes are taxed by 43 states. In six of these, some local taxes
are added. In two others, the states' collections are distributed among
local governments; Wyoming earmarks its tax for this purpose and
Florida allows a credit for locally imposed cigarette taxes against
the state tax. Currently only five states do not have cigarette taxes.
In two, Colorado and Virginia, there are some local levies. Oregon,
California, and North Carolina have neither state nor local taxes.
In the latter two, the general sales tax applies to the sale of cigarettes.
These variations in state taxation reflect differences in attitudes
toward consumer taxes in general and taxes on smoking in particular.
In Oregon, where consumer taxes are given no quarter, the electorate
has twice rejected a cigarette tax. North Carolina and Virginia are
large tobacco producers and apparently labor under the misappre-
hension that a cigarette tax would adversely affect local tobacco
growers, even though their produce is destined very largely for out
of state consumers.
Given this heterogeneous attitude toward cigarette taxation, what
basis is there for presuming that a reduction of the federal tax would
be followed by a corresponding increase in state cigarette taxes?
Some state rate increases would no doubt follow, but not on a scale
which would add to state revenues an amount even approaching the
federal loss. If some states failed to pick up all of the federal tax,
interstate shipments to avoid tax could again become an important
consideration. This problem, it will be recalled, arose in the past
and created a need for the Jenkins Act which requires persons, who
sell cigarettes in interstate commerce and ship them to other than a
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licensed distributor in a state imposing a cigarette tax, to forward to
the tobacco tax administrator of that state monthly information on
cigarette shipments.26
The federal government could place its revenue atthedisposal of
the states by utilizing the credit device—at least for a period of years
until the state tax was well established. This would be state taxation
by congressional compulsion, more akin to the credit in the
ment insurance program than in the estate-inheritance tax areas,
where it was invented to halt interstate competition. A tax forced on
the states by the tax credit route varies from a grant-in-aid only in
degree. Indeed, the grant has the virtues of economical administration
since the federal tax is collected from a relatively few manufacturers,
whereas state taxes have to be collected from a very large number of
wholesalers and retailers. Moreover, its distribution among the
states can be designed to favor jurisdictions with relatively greater
revenue needs, whereas, under the crediting arrangement, benefits
vary in proportion to cigarette consumption which tends to be
correlated with income levels.
Local Telephone Service
The tax on local telephone service figures prominently in current
tax coordination discussions as a result of the proposal of the Joint
Federal-State Action Committee to transfer to the states four-tenths
of the 10 per cent federal tax, in compensation for the termination of
federal vocational education and waste treatment construction
grants
Theoriginal proposal contemplated a credit against the federal tax
for a 4 per cent state tax imposed over and above existing state rates.
The proposal was subsequently modified to meet the objections of
those states which would have lost through the exchange because the
yield of a 4 per cent tax would have fallen short of their share in these
grants. In a later version the credit was limited to a 3 per cent tax but
the revenue equivalent of another 1 per cent is to be distributed among
the states so as to produce for each a surplus in excess of the amount
it now receives from these grants. However, repeal of this tax as of
1960 by the Rate Extension Act of 1959 has effectively shelved this
proposal.
The proposal illustrates the technical difficulties encountered in
26P.L.363, 81st Cong. 1st sess.
27 ProgressReport No. 2, December 1958.
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compensating states for the termination of grants by transferring tax
resources to them. Grants tend to reflect need (at least in part) and
need generally varies inversely with the distribution of tax bases.
F. COORDINATED TAX ADMINISTRATION
This discussion should appropriately take note also of the potentials
of coordinate federal and state tax administration although its
contribution to state and local revenues, the object of this inquiry,
can have only secondary importance. Where it has been adopted,
administrative cooperation has improved state-local revenues by
improving tax enforcement. In some instances, this has been at little
or no cost, but if carried far, the terms of cooperation are likely to
entail an increased investment in enforcement somewhere along the
line.
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the rearrangement of
federal and state tax structures into neat packets which would leave
each level of government with revenue resources in strict correspond-
ence to revenue requirements, without overlapping, is not realizable.
Interstate diversities in economic resources, perverse relationships
between revenue resources and needs, fondness for independent tax
structures, and lack of machinery for crystallizing a unanimous state
viewpoint illustrate the objections.
In these circumstances administrative coordination can afford some
relief and the dedication of tax administrators at all levels of govern-
ment to tax enforcement objectives should contribute to it. As
Professor William Anderson observed ten years ago:
"Within each group handling a function of government there
develops a fellow-feeling, an esprit de corps, a concern for good
results in performing the functions, that cut across geographical
boundaries....Thefunction, not the unit of government, becomes
the concern, and in the handling of the function, the various staff
members even develop some resistance to interference by the units
of government of which they are a part...theintrafunctional group
loyalty tends to gain the ascendancy over the loyalty to a particular
entire unit of government, such as the state, county, or city."28
Administrative coordination by two governments can range from
very loose, almost casual relations to comprehensive integration of
28"SomeTrends in Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations," American Political
Science Association, December 30, 1948, Chicago.
175PROBLEMS CREATED BY MULTILEVEL POLITICAL STRUCTURE
enforcement activities. Two tax administrators with a high degree
of mutual purpose and freedom could conceivably allocate their
separate resources among the several phases of tax enforcement, so as
to achieve essentially the results of a singly administered tax. Indeed,
acting in concert they could develop a more efficient procedure than
acting separately, improving the products of both.
Congressional recognition of the case for administrative coopera-
tion dates from 1935 when disclosure of information from federal
income tax returns to the states was authorized. It required the
Internal Revenue Service, in response to the request of a governor,
to open federal. income tax returns for inspection by state officials
for the purpose of facilitating the administration of state tax laws.
The current version of that provision [Section 6 103(b) of the 1954
Code] is the authority under which the Internal Revenue Service has
developed its exchange information program with the states.
Before 1950, the program consisted largely of a transcript service
to provide copies of federal tax returns to requesting state governors.
It engendered little enthusiasm in the federal Revenue Service because
it encroached on its already limited facilities. While the states re-
imbursed the Service for clerical expenses, their payments accrued
to the credit of the general fund and not to the Revenue Service.29
In 1949, representatives of federal, state and local governments,
meeting under treasury auspices, agreed to develop the potentials
of administrative coordination, specifically through the exchange of
audit information. Soon thereafter, arrangements were made for the
exchange of audit information with Wisconsin and North Carolina
(1950), with Kentucky and Montana(1951), and with Colorado (1952).
While these pilot projects served the essential purpose of breaking
ground in a field that previously had had only scattered attention,
they did not prove to be a great success. Although all participating
states derived some benefit, the federal Revenue Service found it to
be a one-way street in all but one of the states. The information
furnished by the other four states was poor in both quality and quan-
tity and yielded little additional federal revenue.
In response to the recommendation of the President's Commission
29Somestates have apparently found the program very productive from the view-
point of additional revenue collected. See Federation of Tax Administrators, "State
programs for photostating Federal income tax returns," RM-350, May 1958. Effective
January 1, 1959, the charge for preparing abstracts of federal income tax returns and
documents for state governments has been increased from $1.50 to $2.50 per hour.
(IRB 1943—58, p. 47.)
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on Intergovernmental Relations that income tax administrative
cooperation be expanded, the Revenue Service redesigned the pro-
gram to improve its value and attain a better balance between the
benefits it receives and the costs it incurs. With these objectives in
view, an exchange program has been concluded with Minnesota
(1957) and the agreement with Wisconsin has been renegotiated
(1958).
These two new agreements have given the program a new lease on
life. The Revenue Service, plagued perennially with inadequate
budgets, understandably has little enthusiasm for a program which
drains its resources and contributes little in return at a time when an
additional dollar invested in tax enforcement can produce several
dollars of additional collections. To improve the prospects of federal-
state audit exchange, the agreements have been expanded to include
other aspects of income tax administration such as detecting delin-
quencies and unreported refunds, and embrace exchange of informa-
tion on other types of taxes. The agreements also move in the direc-
tion of trying to encourage joint planning, joint action, and limited
sharing of work.
Even assuming encouraging results from the broadened exchange
effort, the bulk of duplicate costs in both compliance and administra-
tion would remain: dual receipt and processing of returns, dual
accounting and collection, separate space, machine facilities and
management. In the individual income tax field the federal govern-
ment has moved predominantly to a refund basis with the mass of
taxpayers, while many states continue on a tax-due basis. This means
that the same taxpayer may be receiving a refund check from the
federal government and almost simultaneously making payment to
his state, instead of having the two transactions handled on a net
basis. Interest in avoiding dual and parallel transactions with separate
governments has produced a few straws in the wind. One recent
example was the legislative proposal (reportedly introduced at the
instance of some states anxious to protect their strict refund pro-
cedures), that the states process both federal and state gasoline tax
refunds with lump sum federal reimbursement of the several states.
While the expanded audit exchange program affords a new attack
on overlapping problems, the rate of progress does not promise large
budgetary relief for the near future. Those probing for larger dividends
from administrative coordination, whether in the form of additional
revenue or economy in operation, are faced with numerous and
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substantial barriers. Some of these are primarily technical and could
be removed with the adoption of strong policy positions fostering
concerted action. As things stand, however, tax administrators have
much concern and little precedent for their authority to join forces.
General authority to exchange information is fairly well established
by statute at both federal and state levels, but specific steps, whether
aimed at enlarging revenues or saving costs, face questions of inter-
pretation. Two procedural problems that have not been surmounted
are the use by one jurisdiction of evidence (audit) provided by the
other level of government, and authority for use of appropriated
funds to do the work of another level of government. Of minor
but more immediate irritation is the priority of liens for collection
which now seems to be accorded to the federal government.30
A more imposing barrier to larger strides towards closer coopera-
tion is the unequal quality of tax enforcement in the several states.
Another, especially relevant in this instance at the federal level, is the
compulsion every tax administrator feels to demonstrate the highest
possible revenue return per dollar appropriated for his activity. Still
another is to be found in the general framework in which coordination
efforts are conducted. There is no organized channel for continuous
dealing with intergovernmental tax relations on a comprehensive
basis, only ad hoc commissions, committees, and forums. Such
progress as has been made by interstate groups engaged in promoting
state community of interests has found no focal point in the federal
hierarchy where planning, legislation and execution of policies can be
responsive. The recently created Office of the Deputy Assistant to
the President for Intergovernmental Relations could remedy this
situation.
The survival of administrative duplication can in part be explained
by a lack of pressure. The era of expanding revenue bases since World
War II has submerged the duplication problem. But the effect of full
employment in filling revenue coffers has also been reflected in
increased cost of tax administration and the difficulty of competent
staffing. The search for administrative economies at both federal and
state levels may bear fruit in bringing about more cooperative use of
resources on enforcement work. The adoption of high-powered
mechanization is also likely to highlight obvious duplication and
suggest more joint planning at the management level. Moreover,
30NationalAssociation of Tax Administrators, "Federal Tax Liens and the Adminis-
tration of State and Local Taxes," B-460, September 3, 1957.
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different levels of government may come to appreciate that they are
not competitive in the sense of business units competing for a share
of the market, but can profitably pooi their knowhow, training
facilities and programming work. Here no preponderance of progress
exists on one side, since there is strong evidence that both state and
federal levels of government have lagged behind the business com-
munity in streamlining their operations.
With the rapid pace inherent in technological applications today
those who would benefit therefrom must move fast. Internal Revenue
is well along toward area-processing in three major centers servicing
sixty-four district offices. Heretofore the district offices provided
units of operation coinciding with state boundaries in most instances.
Unless mechanization of state processing operations takes into
account the changed federal setup, opportunities for coordination
may continue to go by the board.
The testing now under way can provide a valuable feedback.
Through more intimate association with each other's problems, state
and federal administrators can bring up to the legislative and execu-
tive levels the kind of action necessary to clear the way to greater
mutual benefits. But halfway coordination without support from
topside can consume much effort while leaving benefits mostly
unrealized.
3. Debt Financing
Since state and local governments are finding it necessary to cover
a significant portion of their expenditures by borrowing—a condition
expected to continue—and since many, particularly among local
governments, cannot always borrow as cheaply as they may wish,
this examination of ways and means to facilitate local government
financing through intergovernmental action should logically embrace
this problem as well. Time limitation precludes our doing here little
more than assemble a partial inventory of suggested approaches to
the problem.
State and local borrowing has averaged more than $7 billion during
the last several years, raising the volume of outstanding debt from $30
biffion in 1952 to about $57 biffion by the middle of 1958. These
totals compare with about $16 billion at the end of World War II.
In 1957, the only recent year for which data are available, the com-
bined state and local net long-term debt ranged from $42.69 per
$1,000 of personal income in South Dakota to $219.25 in Washington.
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TABLE 14
State and Local Tax Revenues and Interest Payments on General Debt,





Number of States with Interest Payments per $1,000 of Personal Income of:
ALL
STATES $0.72— $1.66— $2.40— $2.85— $3.23— $3.80—
$1.57 $2.39 $2.77 $3.18 $3.76 $5.93
$48.96—$73.29 — 2 1 1 2 2 8
73.83— 79.95 1 — 1 3 1 2 8
81,88— 89.22 — — 2 3 3 — 8
89.31— 93.98 — 4 1 — 1 2 8
93.99— 97.04 4 — 2 1 1 — 8
97.06—116.38 3 2 1 — — 2 8
AliStates 8 8 8 8 8 8
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances in 1957.
Interest charges on the general debt of state and local govern-
ments for that year ranged from 72 cents per $1,000ofpersonal
income in South Dakota to $5.39 in Louisiana.3' Since 1952, annual
interest costs of all state and local governments have increased
from about $725 million to nearly $1.5 billion, and annual debt re-
demption from about $1.8 billion to about $3.2 biffion. Debt service
on the general debt alone is now equivalent to about one-seventh of
tax collections. Compared with earlier years these are striking
magnitudes. They support the contention that variations in the cost
of borrowing may appreciably affect state-local capacity to finance
capital improvements.32
Some interpret the rapid postwar rise in state-local debt as evidence
that these governments are finding it easy enough to borrow; that
perhaps borrowing ought to be made more difficult to encourage
more capital outlay financing out of current income, i.e., taxes.
Others, on the other hand, are preoccupied with the problems of
those jurisdictions which have been unable to borrow despite pressing
needs for capital improvements substantially in excess of capacity
to finance out of current income. They are concerned also with
jurisdictions obliged to pay relatively high interest rates, whose
borrowing potential would be enhanced by a rate As
31 ofthe Census, State and Local Government Finances in 1957.
32Forexample, the savings in financing charges resulting from a reduction in interest
rates from 3.5 per cent to 3 per cent on one year's $7 billion issue of serial bonds
maturing over 25 years, would finance $392.5 million of additional borrowing.
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Table 14 indicates, the debt burdens assumed by state and local
governments appear to bear an inverse relationship to the tax efforts
they are making. The states exerting the highest tax efforts—generally
the low income states—report relatively small interest payments,
even in relation to their low personal incomes. Since these states
generally provide a relatively low level of government service (despite
their high tax effort), the data can be interpreted as support for the
view that a reduction in interest rates would facilitate capital im-
provements in the states where the need is greatest.
A. FEDERAL TAX SUBSIDIES
Exemption from federal income taxes has been a factor in the
demand for state and local obligations since 1913. During most of
this period, municipals shared this favorable position with federal
securities, some wholly and some only partially exempt from federal
income tax. After 1941, when the issuance of tax-exempt federal
securities ceased, the relative tax position of municipals improved as
federal obligations outstanding in 1941 gradually matured and were
retired
Thehigh level of federal tax rates which has prevailed for nearly
two decades and the growing number of investors in the higher
income brackets combined to enhance the value of the privileged
tax position of state and local obligations. However, forces tending
in the opposite direction have also been at work. State and local
governments have poured an unprecedented supply of tax-exempt
obligations into the market, a supply substantially in excess of the
growth in savings seeking this type of investment.34 An increasing
proportion of savings has been channeled through institutional
organizations to whom the tax exemption is of little or no value.
Thus, exemption from income taxation is, and has been, of little
immediate moment to mutual or cooperative financial institutions
and qualified pension funds, and has had relatively little value to life
insurance companies that have been subject to special low rates.
It is of no interest also to regulated investment companies, precluded
from passing the exemption privilege on to their members.
Twosmall tax-exempt issues are still outstanding: $1,485 million in partially
tax-exempt 2 3/4 per cent Treasury Bonds (1960—65) and $50 million in wholly tax-
exempt 3 per cent Panama Canal Bonds (1961).
Roland Robinson, Postwar Marketfor Slate and LocalGovernment Securities,
Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960.
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With a view to broadening the market for state and local obliga-
tions, the President has recommended legislation to permit special
regulated investment companies with assets in state and local securi-
ties to pass on to their stockholders the tax-exempt status of the in-
come they receive from these securities. This recommendation
envisages a special class of regulated investment companies which
invest substantially all of their assets in municipals and have both the
facilities and the incentive to seek out the obligations of small
jurisdictions unknown to most investors. This would channel into
municipal obligations the savings of investors in mutual funds,
a class of investor who presently does not purchase municipals.35
Those in quest of devices to broaden the demand for municipal
obligations, mindful that some investment institutions' lack of
interest in tax-exempt municipals at this time is explained by the
preferential tax treatment they enjoy irrespective of the composition
of their income, view with interest proposals to restrict the favorable
tax treatment of these institutions.
It has been suggested that state and local governments could
preserve a larger share of the value of the exemption of their securities
from federal income tax if they exchanged this exemption for a
federal interest subsidy commensurate with the government's present
revenue loss.36 If, for example (and these numbers are illustrative
only), the annual federal revenue loss from tax exemption is equi-
valent to 1 per cent of state-local debt and the savings to state and
local governments due to the exemption amount to only 0.5 per cent,
state and local governments would find it profitable to forego their
exemptions for a federal subsidy equal to more than 0.5percent of
their future debt offerings. This would divert to state-local govern-
ments a corresponding part of the surplus which now accrues to high
bracket taxpayers at the expense of federal revenues. It would involve
state and local governments voluntarily foregoing their tax exemption
privilege. In the process, an income tax problem would be eliminated,
but only after the lapse of a number of years. During the interval, the
supply of tax exempts already outstanding and held by investors to
whom tax exemption is of relatively little value would gradually drift
to high rate taxpayers (for a gradually increasing price).
H.R. 1222, H. R. 4380, and H. R. 8811 introduced during the Eighty-fifth Congress
incorporate the President's recommendation.
Federal, Staleand Local Government FiscalRelations, Senate Doc. No. 69, 78th
Cong., 1st sess., 1943, p. 28.
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B. SUBSIDIES FOR FINANCIAL STUDIES
AND IMPROVED REPORTING
Part of the borrowing problems of state and local governments
stem from their operating methods—more correctly, from the fact
that some of them operate without methods. Many local governments
typically function without benefit of professional staffs knowledgeable
in the financial markets of which none is more complex than that for
municipals. Moreover, their governing bodies are generally composed
of lay citizens also unversed in the technicalities of complex money
markets. They lack the specialized skills required to manage a
community's, borrowing operations with a view to the most favorable
credit terms; they lack the know-how of debt management. Their
inability to promote investor understanding of the quality of their
obligations by informative reporting contributes to the alleged
inaccessibility to money markets experienced by some, particularly
small, borrowers. The situation has been partially relieved in some
states by machinery developed for assisting political subdivisions
in debt management problems, including the marketing of offerings.
Our host state, Virginia, for example, has a State Commission on
Local Debt which assists cities and counties in this way.37 Some
states provide facilities for pooling the separate small offerings of a
number of borrowers into a single offering more likely to interest the
market. Some states use their sinking, trust, and investment funds to
bolster the demand for local issues. Many obtain technical advice
on the timing and handling of their borrowings from their bankers.
Part of the blame for inadequate investor interest in municipals
is related to poor and disorganized financial reporting by borrowing
jurisdictions. Potential investors find it difficult to ascertain the credit
condition of a particular security offering and of necessity make their
bids on the basis of the least favorable assumptions. The need for
improved and more standardized financial reporting on the part of
borrowing governments, and for channeling of such information to
potential investors is recognized by all concerned with reducing
borrowing costs. To facilitate this end, it has been suggested that the
federal government support and encourage efforts to improve the
quality of municipal financial reporting through the dissemination of
guides to good reporting and possibly by sharing in its costs.
The Commission is authorized to advise political subdivisions on the planning,
preparation and marketing of bonds and to assist in the sale of such bonds. (Codeof
Virginia15-590.2 and .3.)
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In some states, obstacles to borrowing encountered by local
jurisdictions stem from constitutional or statutory limitations which
have grown out of improvident borrowing practices in former epochs.
Necessity has fathered various devices to circumvent these pro-
hibitions. Limitations expressed as a percentage of assessed valuation,
for example, have been side-stepped by raising the ratio of assessed to
market value of property. The public "authority" has been invented,
adding to the complexity of the governmental structure. In still other
places, "public spirited citizens" have organized nonprofit corpora-
tions to act on behalf of their local governments. They have under-
taken to construct the required facility, lease it to the community,
and finance its construction by debt secured with a long-term lease.
School buildings, utility enterprises, and athletic facilities have been
financed in this way.
These are half-way measures lacking in forthrightness. Direct
solutions are preferred by most students of the problem: the revision
of statutory and constitutional provisions to accord with present
day needs.38 With this in mind, suggestions have been made for
federal financial aid to assist and encourage the states to finance
studies looking to the updating of constitutional and statutory
provisions, the development of more meaningful norms for debt
limitation purposes, and to ensure widespread distribution of their
findings to facilitate the public understanding prerequisite to bring
about these changes. The grants for urban planning provided small
communities under Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 illustrate
this kind of federal assistance to enable local governments to help
themselves.39
C. INSURANCE PROGRAMS
Proposals have been advanced also to insure state and local
obligations. The excellent risk performance of these obligations
suggests that this would entail a very low premium charge. Since a
mandatory program is not compatible with the conventions of a
federal-state relationship, such a program would presumably be
offered on an optional basis. This, however, would tend to limit
insurance coverage to the poorer quality obligations, and such adverse
risk selection would markedly increase premium costs. Mandatory
Report of the President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June 1955,
p. 98.
"Section320 of the Housing Act of 1959, S. 7, 86th Cong., 1st sess., as passed by the
Senate, would broaden eligibility for these grants.
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coverage presents no problem for individual states with respect
to their own political subdivisions. It is not known, however, whether
any of the states has actively considered operating such an insurance
program, or whether it would be practicable to provide facilities for
sharing such state risks through a national reinsurance agency.
Federal statutes contain a variety of insurance programs which are
sununarized annually in a special analysis of federal credit programs
included as a regular feature of the President's Budget and need not
be detailed here.4°
D. FEDERAL GUARANTEES
With a view to reducing the cost of borrowing for various public
objectives, such as housing and school construction, proposals have
been considered on various occasions in the past that the federal
government guarantee the particular obligations. In recent years this
form of assistance has been urged to facilitate the construction of
public school and college facilities. Such a guarantee applied to a
municipal obligation would create a super security which possessed
the safety of a federal obligation and the tax exemption privilege of a
state or local obligation. The local public housing authority bonds
backed by a government commitment to cover debt service costs in
excess of the income from the property have been criticized for this
reason. To avoid this result, the Administration's program to en-
courage the construction of college facilities makes the proposed
guaranty of the principal of and interest on the bonds of educational
institutions conditional upon the income from such bonds being
subject to federal taxation.4'
E. FEDERAL PURCHASE OF MUNICIPALS
To complete this inventory, mention should be made also of the
suggestion that either through the treasury or through a specially
created corporation the federal government stand ready to purchase
municipal obligations when financing terms available in the market
are unsatisfactory. These obligations would then either be resold
under appropriate market conditions or held to maturity. A national
credit agency could conceivably finance the purchase of state and
local obligations by public offerings of its own obligations secured by
its portfolio of municipals. Depending upon the terms of purchase,
See,for example, The Budget for Fiscal Year 1960, Special Analysis E, pp. 957—69.
Section2(a) of S. 1017, 86th Cong., 1st sess.
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this could assist some borrowing jurisdictions and incidentally curtail
the flow of tax-exempt obligations to private investors.
In lieu of purchasing local obligations, the federal and state govern-
ments could jointly undertake to meet the debt service cost on
obligations issued by needy jurisdictions under conditions that the
community maintain a reasonable tax effort, and so long as it is
unable to meet this obligation. This is a feature of the Administra-
tion's school construction assistance program under which the
federal government would advance half of the cost of debt service
on school construction bonds issued by needy jurisdictions, if the
state undertakes to advance the other half.42
The problem of marketing municipal obligations is generally
believed to be due in part to the absence of an adequate secondary
market for municipal obligations, which tends to restrict the purchase
of these obligations to investors prepared. to hold them until matur-
ity.43 This suggests that an inventory of possible aids to state and
local borrowing should include also possibilities for developing a
more adequate secondary market. Conceivably this would then take
any one of several forms, such as a national organization on the
pattern of the Federal National Mortgage Association or regional
organizations akin to the federal land banks.
Some of the devices here catalogued, employed singly or in com-
bination, could probably facilitate state and local borrowing. Analysis
is required to determine which, if any, would on balance serve the
national interest. It is essential to keep in view, however, that the
limitations on the borrowing capacity of a jurisdiction stem more
from the of its economic capacity to support debt than
from technicalities of the money market or the jurisdiction's lack of
skill to exploit it. This is not to deny that money market conditions
affect credit operations, both public and private. If, for example,
national credit policies pursued in the interest of economic stability
increase borrowing costs, it is no more possible and desirable to
insulate state and local governments than the federal government
from such increases. Moreover, the effectiveness of national policies
in achieving stable economic growth may, in the long run, have a
more significant impact on the capacity of state and local govern-
ments to provide public services than factors within their own
control.
S. 1016, 86th Cong., 1st sess.
Robinson, op. cit.
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4. Financial Aids to State and
Local Government
In terms of net federal budgetary expenditures federal aid to state
and local governments in cash and in kind equalled early in the
1950's about 9 per cent of total state-local general revenues. Recently,
federal aid (including grants from the new highway trust fund) has
declined to about 7 per cent, as direct revenues have increased more
rapidly. Early in the decade, too, these payments equaled some 3 to
4 per cent of total federal cash payments to the public; currently they
are running at 5 or 6 per cent, and the budget estimates for 1959 and
1960 indicate federal aid equaling 7 and 8 per cent of federal pay-
ments to the public.
Measured on the basis of the state-local accounts, the cash grants-
in-aid and all other intergovernmental payments received from the
federal government were just over one-tenth of all state-local general
revenues for the five years 1953—57, inclusive. They financed 9.5 per
cent of direct general expenditures of the state and local governments
during the 5 years.
The importance of these aids in state-local finance varies greatly
among the states and among particular programs. For federal
finance, likewise, the differences between programs are substantial.
Each type of variation will be reviewed.
First it should be noted, however, that we are dealing here with
relationships that are only partly measurable in pecuniary terms—and
for which, even in the measurable area, different figures are reported
depending on the point at which data are compiled.
Some aid received from the federal government is not reflected in
the financial accounts of state and local governments. This contributes
to an understatement of the magnitude of state-local operations and
perhaps to some understatement of the fiscal support they receive
from the federal government.
Already noted is the indirect aid afforded by the deductibility of
state and local income, property, and other taxes from personal and
corporate incomes in computing federal income tax liability, and by
the federal tax exemption of interest-income from municipal bonds.
Also, the development of a direct federal program may provide
indirect aid by relieving state and local units of related needs for
expenditure; this is illustrated by the federal old-age, survivors,
and disability insurance system in relation to federal-state-local public
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TABLE 15
Federal Aid to State and Local Governments,





























































SOURCE: Budget of the United States, fiscal years 1953—60, special analyses.
aIncludesgrants paid from highway trust fund and loans from unemployment
trust fund, fiscal years 1957—60.





°Includesloans from the unemployment trust fund, as follows:
1958 $3
1959 estimated 116
dRepaymentsreceived exceeded new loans by the amount of negative expenditures
shown here.
assistance. Similarly, federally sponsored fellowships and traineeships
in public service fields of special concern to state and local govern-
ments—particularly health, education, and science—may promote the
productivity and efficiency of state and local program operations.
Indeed, federally sponsored research and development sometimes
affects profoundly the content and objectives of public programs at
all levels.
Even among direct federal aids, those involving cooperative
administration, exchanges of personnel and services, and grants-in-
kind usually leave no financial tracks in the state and local accounts.
The various grants-in-kind are, however, included in the federal
budget analyses of expenditures for aids to state and local govern-
ments. Of greater significance in the totals is the fact that the federal
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datainclude loans on a net basis. That is, in the federal government
accounts, the amounts lent to state and local governments (whether
through purchases of their securities or through other types of ad-
vances) are considered expenditures and any repayments received are
deducted from expenditures. In recent years, repayments received
have largely offset the loans made. In fact, in 1954 and 1955 the
repayments exceeded the new loans, producing "negative expendi-
tures" in this category of federal aid.
A ten-year summary of the federal budgetary totals is given in
Table 15.
A. GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS RELATING
FEDERAL AID TO PERSONAL INCOMES
This section gives particular attention to interstate or interregional
differences in the relative importance of federal aids because, as was
noted early in this paper, the uneven geographic distribution of
resources is the genesis of most problems in federal-state fiscal
relations. These geographic variations have greatly complicated the
task of the Joint Federal-State Action Committee which was set up
in 1957 to develop practical proposals for increasing the fiscal
resources available to state-local governments while reducing the
volume of federal grants-in-aid. The Committee, after surveying
intensively the broad problem of equalization, has suggested the
possible necessity of "block" grants—i.e., grants for an unassigned
general purpose in place of grants for specific purposes.44 Some
aspects of the Joint Committee's work, as well as the earlier report
of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, are noted below.
A definite tendency for the existing federal grants to help equalize
fiscal means relative to personal incomes and to state-local general
revenues is evident in gross geographical comparisons for recent
years. The summary data will be given for the fiscal year 1957.
In the broad groupings of Table 16, per capita federal grants in the
aggregate and for each of several problem categories are highest in
the group of low-income states and lowest in the high-income group.
The inverse relationship exhibited in these broad groupings of states
and of programs is sufficiently pronounced that if judgment were
based on these data alone the pattern might seem creditable to design
"Cf. SecondReport of the Joint Federal-StateAction Committee tothe President of
the United States and to the Chairman of the Governors' Conference, ProgressReport
No. 2, December 1958, pp. 8, 47.
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TABLE 16
Federal Grants to State and Local Governments
in Amounts Per Capita, by Function, as Related to Personal Income
Levels in Three Groups of States: Fiscal Year 1957












Per capita federal grants, 1957:
Total $23.11 $18.76 $26.43 $30.54
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SOURCE: Adapted from Sophie R. Dales, "Federal Grants to State and Local Govern-
ments, .1956—57," Social Security Bulletin, June 1958, pp. 13—18, Tables 2 and 3, with
additions as noted.
Omits Alaska and Hawaii; includes District of Columbia.
bIncludesDistrict of Columbia.
cIncludesdistribution of certain federal tax collections to state accounts in unemploy-
ment trust fund.
UIncludedwith "all other" in Social Security Bulletin. To make this separation,
highway grants per capita were calculated approximately for each of the three groups
of states and for the continental total, and deducted from the corresponding per capita
amount of "all other" grants as shown in the Bulletin. The highway grants, by state
totals, are from Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report on the State of the Finances,
1957, p. 578, col. 13; population for the per capita averages, from Table 2 in the Social
SecurityBulletin.
Percapita average for Continental U.S.
and intention. In fact, of course, the pattern is only in part a product
of design; moreover, the broad groupings cancel out many internal
deviations, and closer inspection of underlying data emphasizes that
the progression is not regular or fully balanced. But the general
picture is coherent enough to warrant further description.
The use of per capita averages and, ratios to personal incomes for
some of these comparisons is not meant to suggest that the need for or
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the level of particular services is best measured in this way. In some
fields, such as highway construction or forest fire prevention, a simple
population count (or a comparison of income levels) may be almost
irrelevant to program objectives.
Yet there is logic in the use of such measurements for assessing the
broad impact of federal aid. In our society, at any given time, the over-
all magnitude of the needs of a state for public services is more
directly affected by the size and affluence of the population than by
most of its other attributes, and the fiscal capability of the state and
local units is clearly dependent on the relative affluence of their
constituencies. Apart from the stimulation of particular programs,
the primary general purpose of assistance from the federal govern-
ment is to assure support everywhere for some minimum standards in
selected public services; and the need for the federal aid arises from
variations in the fiscal capabilities of the states and their subdivisions.
Almost certainly, the best general, comprehensive measurement of
differences in the need for such aid is to be found in population and
personal income differences. Moreover, the averages and ratios do
afford a rough-and-ready basis for comparison—a point of departure
for more thorough analysis.
Federal grant-in-aid objectives, it has often been observed, are not
directed explicitly toward interstate equalization of per capita personal
incomes.45 A federal-aid system intended to redistribute income
would be quite different from the heterogeneous, multi-purpose
arsenal of many-sized aids presently included in the federal budget.
Nevertheless if a by-product of these programs is some interstate
redistribution of means, that tendency may be significant for an
examination of interlevel fiscal problems, whatever the justifications
that were advanced for establishing the individual programs.
Data for the fiscal year 1952, as analyzed by Selma Mushkin,
support a conclusion that in that year at least, although federal
government expenditures taken as a whole "appear to result in
As Miss Mushkin has cautioned:
"Equalization of state (per capita) income and equalization of minimum program
levels, paralleled by more uniform state and local taxing effort, are two different
things.Moreover,they have different purposes. The design of federal grants to
achieve a national minimum program level, without requiring disproportionate
state and local tax burdens, needs to be considered without being confused with
equalization of state income."
Selma Mushkin, "Federal Grants and Federal Expenditures," in National Tax Journal,
September 1957, p.197. Cf. Howard 0. Schaller (whom Miss Mushkin quotes),
"Federal Grants-in-Aid and Differentials in State Per-Capita Incomes, 1929, 1939,
and 1949," in ibid., September 1955, pp. 287—99.
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redistribution of income additional to that effected by federal taxes,"
the federal grants as a group had "negligible equalizing effects."4°
Howard Schaller found that "all grants-in-aid combined reduced the
relative difference in state per capita incomes by 2 per cent in 1949
and 1 per cent in 1939," whereas they had "negligible" effects in
1929. His measurements indicated that grants under the Social
Security Act alone "significantly affected the relative differences,
reducing them by 1 per cent in both 1949 and
It may be that federal grants now exhibit somewhat greater equaliz-
ing tendencies relative to personal incomes than they did a few years
ago.48 This could well reflect both the narrowing of the range of
interstate differences in per capita incomes and some increase in the
ratio of aggregate federal aid to personal incomes. In 1929 and 1939,
the highest state average of personal income per capita was more than
four times the lowest, and in 1952 the ratio was 2.8 to 1; by 1957 the
difference again had widened slightly, to a ratio of 3 toAggregate
federal-aid payments in 1929 equaled about one-eighth of 1 per cent
of personal incomes; in 1952, just under 1 per cent; and in 1957,
1.2 per cent.5°
Over the last 30 to 50 years, the rise in the relative magnitude of
federal aid has certainly substituted federal taxes (with emphasis on
the taxation of personal incomes at progressive rates) for the more
46Mushkin,bc.. cit., pp. 205, 208.
Schaller, bc. cit., p. 298.
48Wehave not equated our data directly with the series compiled by Miss Mushkin
and Mr. Schaller in their articles.
Likewise we have not attempted to ascertain whether our observation as to present
tendencies toward equalization relative to personal incomes indicates a change in the
situation described by V. 0. Key, Jr., in 1942, when he found that dominant form
of grant compels the states and localities to bear a share of the cost of the aided programs
that as between states becomes more burdensome from state to state as resources
decline." (The Matching Requirement in Federal Grant Legislation in Relation to Varia-
tions in State Fiscal Capacity, preliminary draft; Federal Security Agency, Social
Security Board, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Bureau Memorandum No. 46,
February 1942, p. 57.) Key's analysis was based on interstate comparisons of the
burdens involved in matching federal grants. Our analysis is based on the aggregate
amounts of federal aid actually paid.
Also pertinent for its discussion of issues and objectives in equalization is Byron L.
Johnson, The Principle of Equalization Applied to the Allocation of Grants in Aid, ibid.,
Bureau Memorandum No. 66, September 1947.
Cf. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Personal Income by
States since 1929, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business, by Charles F.
Schwartz and Robert E. Graham, Jr., 1956, Table 2, pp. 142—3; and Survey of Current
Business, August 1958, p. 13.
Personalincome totals from ibid.; federal aid totals from Census compilations
and federal Budget.
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diversified state and local tax systems as the means of financing a
substantial volume of expenditures.
As a central objective of policy or as a qualifying consideration,
the promotion of interstate equalization in personal incomes is
several degrees less remote for federal aid programs than for the
geographic incidence of federal taxes and the benefit or incidence
distribution of aggregate federal expenditures, to which Miss Mush-
kin referred. Indeed, it seems evident that the federal-aid system,
especially the grants-in-aid and the loans, grew up as one type of
practical accommodation to problems that confront a multilevel
political structure in which the subdivisions exhibit diverse economic,
as well as political and social, characteristics.
Over the years, per capita personal income averages by states have
been specified as factors in an increasing number of the statutory
formulas for grant apportionment and grant matching. The language
of hearings and debates suggests that the purpose—at least the ex-
pressed purpose—has usually been to improve upon simple head
counts as a measure of relative need for a particular public service
and relative capacity to finance it from state and local resources.
Not even in the consideration and approval of the successive
statutory increases in the large public assistance grant program has
interstate redistribution of incomes been identified as a purpose of the
program. The case has been made almost wholly in terms of the fiscal
inability of state and local governments to meet the particular,
apparently irreducible, need. Still, the pressures for larger grants and
for less state-and-local matching have been so persistent and so
repeatedly successful as to warrant an inference that they derive some
of their persuasive force from considerations outside the public
assistance program itself.
The case is reminiscent of the origins of large state-aid funds for
public schools in various states, where the stated interest of many
proponents was to transfer the support of a major item of expenditure
from local property taxpayers to state taxpayers. Public education was
a program with wide popular support and of state-wide concern; a
large measure of property-tax relief could be accomplished with state
aid covering only a fraction of the cost.
It would be difficult to demonstrate that an analogous purpose has
influenced congressional legislation for public assistance grants. The
tendency to increasing reliance on financing by federal taxation is,
however, evident in the results.
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The commission on Intergovernmental Relations, in its report in
1955, said it did not believe that "the 'equalization' of the general
fiscal capacities of the states is by itself a proper objective of National
policy."5' The Commission flatly rejected, without dissent, proposals
for federal grants "to reduce fiscal disparities" among the states and
the alternative of "a comprehensive subsidy program for general
governmental purposes •"52
Morerecently the Joint Federal-State Action Committee has
raised anew the question whether it would be practicable to make
interstate equalization a specific objective of policy. The Committee
has therefore undertaken to study:
(1) the feasibility of replacing grants for spec f/icpurposesby an
unassigned general purpose (block) grant as an alternative approach
to revenue source adjustment; and (2) the practicability of revising
grant formulas to relate grants to per capita incomes.53
Against this background of policy discussion, a description of
existing relationships is of some interest. The geographic comparisons
are summarized first in terms of aggregates and then by program
categories.
In iheaggregate. Takingall the federal grants together (but
omitting other types of federal aid), the national per capita average in
fiscal 1957 was $23.11. (Table The over-all averages for three
Commissionon Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to the President/or Trans-
mittal tothe Congress, June 1955, p. 135.
52lbid.,pp.110—15.
Joint Federal-State Action Committee, 2d Report, December 1958, P. 8 and
appendix vi. (Italics in original.) Informal discussions suggest that the Commission's
interest subsequently shifted from unassigned general purpose grants to functional
block grants, e.g., a single grant for public health.
This average and the statistics immediately below are from the Social Security
Bulletin, June 1958, pp. 15 and 16, Tables 2 and 3, with some modifications. The pay-
ments represent grants only, and the total of 83,933 million shown for fiscal 1957 is
very close to the $3,943 million reported in the federal Budget as actual grant-in-aid
expenditures (see Table 15).
A per capita average of $22.57 is reported in the Census of Governments for 1957
for all intergovernmental payments from the federal government. Comparable detailed
amounts for functional or program categories are not available from the Census.
All state and local government data in this section, unless attributed to another
source, are from publications of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Governments Division. Data for 1957 are from 1957 Census of Governments Advance
Releases, No. 8, StateandLocal Government Finances in 1957 (issued February 1959).
Data for the period 1953—57, inclusive, are from the annual Summary of Governmental
Finances for these years.
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groups of states (including the District of Columbia but omitting
Alaska and Hawaii) are as follows:
1. In the sixteen states with the lowest per capita personal in-
comes, the federal grants averaged $30.54 per capita—32 per cent
above the national average. The median state in this group was
29 per cent below the national average for personal incomes.
2. In the sixteen states (including the District of Columbia) with
highest per capita personal incomes, the federal grants per capita
averaged $18.76—19 per cent below the national average. The
median state in this group was 18 per cent above the national average
for personal incomes.
3. In the seventeen middle-income states, average federal grants
at $26.43 per capita were 14 per cent above the national average.
The median state was 11 per cent below the national average for
personal incomes.
Irregularities in the progression come to light in Tables 17 and 18,
where 48 states (excluding the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and
Alaska) are divided on the basis of per capita personal incomes into
eight groups of six states each.55 Table 17 reports for each six-state
group the average annual personal income per capita during the four
years 1954—57 and the share of each group in the 48-state total for
1957 of personal incomes, population, state-local general revenues
(including revenue from the federal government), and state-local
general expenditures. In Table 18 these revenue and expenditure data
are converted to index numbers or relatives, with the 48-state average
for each series taken as the base, or 100.
Thus, if state-local general revenues from the federal government
were distributed among the eight groups of states in the same pro-
portions as personal incomes, the index number for the series would
be 100 for each six-state group. Instead, the range shown is from
70 in the next-to-highest income group (group 2) to 214 in the sixth
group (comprising states that ranked 31st to 36th in per capita
incomes—namely, Utah, Maine, Vermont, Idaho, Oklahoma, and
New Mexico). State-local general revenues from their own sources
and general expenditures for all purposes (including the federally
financed expenditures) cluster much more narrowly about the average
relationship to personal incomes than does the federal aid.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.PROBLEMS CREATED BY MULTILEVEL POLITICAL STRUCTURE
For general expenditures and for nonfederal revenues, as for
federal aid, the highest ratio to personal incomes is in the sixth group
of states.56
Revenues received from the federal government in 1957 tended not
only to be highest per capita in the states with lowest personal
incomes; they also tended, on the whole, to be greatest in states that
drew most heavily on their own taxable resources.57 To illustrate:
1. Of the twelve states with the highest ratios of nonfederal
state-local general revenues to personal incomes, ten were among
the top twelve in the ratio of revenues from the federal government
to personal incomes. In this group of states, state-local general
revenue from nonfederal sources ranged from a maximum of 15.9
per cent of personal income in North Dakota to 11.8 per cent in
Oklahoma. The federal payments ranged from 4.2 per cent of
personal income in Wyoming to 1.3 per cent in Minnesota. In North
Dakota, the federal payments equaled 2.2 per cent of personal
income.
2. Of the twelve states with the lowest ratios of nonfederal
state-local general revenues to personal incomes, eight were among
the lowest twelve for the ratio of revenues from the federal govern-
ment to personal incomes. Iii this group of states, state-local general
revenue from nonfederal sources ranged from a minimum of 6.8
per cent of personal income in Delaware to 9.4 per cent in Nebraska.
The federal payments ranged from 0.4 to 1 per cent of personal
TheCensus statistics on which these tabulations are based combine all types of
revenue received from the federal government. An analysis confined to grants-in-aid
alone (as are the preceding comparisons for three broad groups of states, based on the
Social Security Bulletin Tables) might show a stronger tendency for federal assistance,
insofar as it takes the form of grants, to be associated inversely with the level of personal
incomes. However, emphasis upon public lands, total land area, and road mileage as
factors in the distribution of the large federal grants for highway construction is a
qualifying factor.
The high index number of 214 for the relationship between federal aid and personal
incomes in the sixth group of states (in Table 18) is considerably affected by the highway
grants. In this six-state group, highway construction grants received in 1957 averaged
about $12.67 per capita, compared with a 48-state average of $5.74.
Shared revenues are more important in certain other groups of states. This is illus-
trated by data for the third group, which includes Wyoming—l6th among the 48
states in personal income per capita. Wyoming derived under the Mineral Leasing Act
between one-third and one-half of all state-local general revenues received from the
federal government in 1957, whereas this category accounted for less than 1 per cent
of all federal aid payments to all state-local governments. Federal payments to Wyoming
state-local general revenues for all purposes in 1957 averaged $84.88 per capita.
The frequency groupings that underlie this paragraph are derived from the 1957
Census of Governments.
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income in New Jersey—the lowest among the 48 states—to 1.6 per
cent in Missouri. For Nebraska, the federal payments equaled 1.3 per
cent of personal income.
3. Among the middle twelve states in terms of the ratio of non-
federal state-local general revenue to personal incomes, only five
were among the middle twelve in the ratio of revenues from the federal
government to personal incomes. In this median group, the range of
state-local general revenue from their own sources was narrow—from
11.1 per cent of personal income in Florida to 10.0 per cent in
Michigan. The range of federal government payments in the twelve
states was not so narrow; it varied from 2.5 per cent in Arkansas to
0.6 per cent in New York. For Florida, the federal payments were
1.2 per cent of personal income—approximately at the nation-wide
average; and for Michigan, 0.9 per cent.
Regional tendencies also are pronounced, as Table 19 indicates.
Relative to personal incomes, state-local revenue from the federal
government is lowest in the New England, Mideast, and Great Lakes
states. With the exception of Vermont and Maine, the sixteen states
in these three regions all rank from 34th to 48th in the ratio of federal
revenue to personal income. It is highest in the Far West, Rocky
Mountain, and Southwest states, where nine of the thirteen states
are in the top one-third. In the Plains and the Southwest, the
relationship is less evident.58
By program categories59—Taking the grants by separate functional
or program categories shown in Table 16, the 1957 arithmetic means
for three broad groups of states (including the District of Columbia
but omitting Alaska) were as follows:
1. For public assistance, the average per capita federal grant
in the sixteen lowest-income states was 45 per cent above the national
average; in the sixteen highest-income states, it was 21 per cent
below the national average.
2. For health services, the grant average in the lowest-income
states was 70 per cent above the national average, and in the highest
income states, 35 per cent below. Grants for all health programs were
one-tenth as much as for public assistance.
3. For "other" welfare services, the per capita grant average in
58Thedata underlying this paragraph are from the 1957 Census of Government.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































fPROBLEMS CREATED BY MULTILEVEL POLITICAL STRUCTURE
the lowest-income group was 34 per cent above the national average,
and in the highest-income group, 12 per cent below.
4. For highway construction, per capita grants tended to be
highest in the middle-income states. In the seventeen middle states,
the average grant was 43 per cent above the national average. In the
sixteen lowest-income states the grant average was 13 per cent above
the national average. In the sixteen highest-income states, it was 24
per cent below the national average. The greatly increased grants for
the 41,000-mile interstate network began in fiscal 1957.
5.Employment-security also reveals a special pattern. These
grants are primarily for the full administrative expenses of the state
unemployment compensation system and employment services. Their
expense runs highest, relative to total population, in the more
industrialized states—and these are the states with the highest per
capita incomes. Thus, the federal grants for employment-security
in the sixteen lowest-income states averaged 25 per cent below the
national per capita average, and the average for the middle-income
group was almost as low. In the sixteen highest-income states, the
grants averaged 17 per cent above the national average.
6. In grants for education, the largest amount of federal aid
in recent years has been for school districts especially affected by
federal government activities, such as military installations. Educa-
tion grants in the aggregate in the sixteen lowest-income states
averaged 11 per cent above the national per capita average but they
were still higher in the middle-income group—24 per cent above the
national average. For the sixteen highest-income states, grants for
education fell below the national average by 14 per cent.
7. All other grants, for a variety of programs taken as a group,
exhibited some general tendency toward equalization relative to
personal incomes. In the sixteen lowest-income states, the average
per capita was 62 per cent above the national average, and in the
sixteen highest-income states it was 24 per cent below. The middle-
group average was close to the national average.
B. FUNCTIONAL OR PROGRAM DIFFERENCES
The foregoing comparisons relate federal aid in the fiscal year
1957 to per capita personal incomes. The pattern of federal aid may
also be usefully described in terms of geographical or other variations
in the direct, quantitative importance of federal support for the
several functions of state and local governments. The following
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general and somewhat tentative account is drawn from a combination
of data already published in Census reports and those available from
other sources. It is based on summations for the five years, 1953
through 1957.
The importance of federal financial aid in particular program
categories may be assessed from the separate points of view of the
state-local and the national governments. The relationship to the
state-local programs is described first.
FEDERAL AID RELATED TO STATE-LOCAL EXPENDITURES BY PROGRAM
CATEGORIES. The concentration of federal aid upon two or three
program categories is evident both in Table 16, giving per capita
amounts, and in Table 20, giving aggregates over a longer period. Of
TABLE 20
Federal Financing of State and Local Functions in the














General revenue, total $160,369 S16,I40b $144,229 10.1
Direct general expenditures:
Total 169,484 16,158 153,326 9.5
By functions:
Public welfare 15,692 7,215 8,477 46.0
Health and hospitals 13,131 481 12,650 3.7
Employment security
administration 1,050 1,050 0 100.0
Education 59,575 2,644 56,931 4.4
Highways 31,681 3,305 28,376 10.4
Natural resources 4,168 438 3,730 10.5
Other and unallocable 44,187 1,025 43,162 2.3
SOURCE: Compiled from Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, annual
Summary of Governmental Finances, 1955—56, and 1957, Tables 1 and 8.
aBysubtraction.
bThistabulation reflects the Census classification of all intergovernmental expendi-
tures by the federal government as general revenue to the state and local governments.
Thus, the reported general revenue receipts of the states from the federal government
in 1957 omit $30 million credited to unemployment trust fund revenues of the states;
there was no corresponding item in the preceding years.
the $16 billion paid to state and local governments during the five
years that ended with 1957, more than $13 billion, or five-sixths, was
for pUblic welfare, highways, and education.
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The federal government financed nearly half46 per cent—of all
state and local expenditures for public welfare (and 49.8 per cent of
that major segment of public welfare known as "public assistance").
Federal grants financed substantiallyallstate administrative
expenses for the employment security system (unemployment insur-
ance and employment services).
Federal payments for highways, though substantial in amount,
covered only 10.4 per cent of the $32 billion that state and local
governments spent for highway purposes. The same percentage of
natural resource expenditures was financed by federal aid; the dollar-
amount of this aid, however, was much smaller.
Federal assistance for education has been dominated by the
geographically spotty distribution to selected school districts. The
aggregate federal payments covered but 4.4 per cent of the near- $60-
billion total of state-local direct expenditures over the five-year period.
Health and hospital expenditures in the aggregate amounted to
$13 billion in the five years—barely more than a fifth of the amount
for education. Federal payments financed 3.7 per cent of state-local
expenditures for health and hospitals.
For nearly all other functional categories of state and local service,
federal grants were relatively small in aggregate amount and small in
comparative importance. Important for particular programs were
federal grants for airport construction, slum clearance, urban renewal,
low-rent housing, disaster relief, soldiers' homes, and perhaps a few
others, but all these programs summed together were a small part of
state-local expenditures. Among state and local services entirely
without federal assistance, probably the largest financially are police
and fire protection. Several writers have pointed out that federal aid
has been used to help finance the service programs rather than the
regulatory activities of government.60
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. In the public assistance program, the federal
grants finance—by a complicated and frequently liberalized formula
—the major portion of assistance provided by public agencies to four
categories of needy people: the aged, the blind, the permanently and
totally disabled, and dependent children. All other needy persons who
may be given relief by public agencies are classified as receiving
"general assistance," a category that is not federally aided.
60Cf.V. 0. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal Grants to States, Chicago, 1937,
p. 381; Paul Studenski andE. J.Baikie, "Federal Grants-in-Aid," National Tax Journal,
September 1949, P. 197; Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Report (1955),
p. 125.
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Until the recent rise in highway construction grants, public assis-
tance was for years the largest single avenue of federal financial aid
to state and local governments. The needs for public assistance tend
to be proportionately greatest in the less affluent states. Also the
formulas for federal matching of state-local expenditures have given
greatest weight to the lower average relief payments in those states.
Consequently, the public assistance grants have long exhibited an
inverse association with average personal incomes in the several
states. Extensive amendments enacted in 1958 are strengthening
somewhat further this equalizing effect, although their full influence
will become apparent only gradually.
The past equalizing tendency, relative to personal incomes, is
evident in Table 21, in which the federal grants are shown to have
financed during the period 1953—57 about two-fifths of public
assistance expenditures in the twelve states with the highest per capita
incomes and about two-thirds in the twelve states with the lowest
per capita incomes. The progression is not regular, however. Among
the six-state groups, the percentages for groups 3 and 6 deviate most
noticeably. The high over-all federal percentage of 51.3 for group 3
reflects especially a ratio of 64 per cent federal financing in Missouri.
The comparatively low over-all ratio of 54.9 per cent in group 6 is
substantiallydetermined by Oklahoma, which accountedfor
more public assistance expenditures than the other fivestates
combined.
FEDERAL AID RELATED TO FEDERAL EXPENDITURES BY PROGRAM
CATEGORIES. As is evident in Table 22, the federal functional categories
in which federal-aid payments were most significant during the five
fiscal years, 1953—57, were (1) labor and welfare—83 per cent, and
(2) commerce an4 housing—38 per cent.
Labor and welfare as a budget category includes public assistance,
a program in which the grant payments accounted for all but one-
tenth of 1 per cent of the federal expenditures. It includes also labor
and manpower, in which the grants (predominantly for employment
security) represented 75 per cent of the federal outlay; and education,
in which they were 74 per cent. In the field of public health, including
hospital construction grants,federal aid represented less than
half45 per cent—of all federal expenditures for the five years.
Of the hospital grants, about half were for private, nonprofit institu-
tions. There was no federal aid for correctional and penal institutions,
although there were payments for the use of local jails. There would
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TABLE 21
Public Assistance Financing, by Groups of States:
Five-Year Totals, 1953—57, Inclusive
GROUP OF 6 STATES (GROUPED
IN ORDER OF AVERAGE
PERSONAL INCOMES PER
CAPITA, 4 YEARS 1954—57)
EXPENDITURESFORPUBLICASSIsTANCE,a 5 YEARS1953—57
Total Federal State Local
AMOUNT (ruLuoNs)
Group 1 (highest incomes) $3,766 $1,543 $1,346 $877
2 3,282 1,341 1,525 416
3 1,660 852 710 98
4 1,297 542 443 312
5 1,485 940 467 78
6 798 438 340 20
7 1,440 927 460 53
8 (lowest incomes) 1,167 838 280 50
48-State total 14,895 7,419 5,571 1,905
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR THE GROUP
Group 1 (highest incomes) 100.0 41.0 35.7 23.3
2 100.0 40.8 46.5 12.7
3 100.0 51.3 42.8 5.9
4 100.0 41.8 34.2 24.0
5 100.0 63.3 31.4 5.3
6 100.0 54.9 42.6 2.5
7 100.0 64.4 31.9 3.7
8 (lowest incomes) 100.0 71.7 24.0 4.3
48-State total 100.0 49.8 37.4 12.8
PERCENTAGE OF 48-STATE TOTAL
Group I (highest incomes) 25.3 20.8 24.2 46.0
2 22.0 18.1 27.4 21.9
3 11.1 11.5 12.7 5.1
4 8.7 7.3 7.9 16.4
5 10.0 12.6 8.4 4.1
6 5.4 5.9 6.1 1.1
7 9.7 12.5 8.3 2.8
8 (lowest incomes) 7.8 11.3 5.0 2.6
48-State total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Basic data from Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplements
for 1953—57 inclusive.
aComprisesthe four federally aided categories, general assistance, and adminis-
trative expenses.
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TABLE 22
Federal Aid to State and Local Governments as an Element in Federal


















Federal Government, Total $343,555 $16,502 4.8 100.0
Major national security 228,030 0 0
International affairs and finance 3,727 — 0 0
Veterans services and benefits 22,560 36 0.1 0.2
Labor and Welfare:
Public assistance 7,214 7,205 99.9 43.7
Labor and manpower 1,761 1,318 74.8 8.0
Promotion of public health
(includes hospitals) 1,703 764 44.9 4.6
Education 1,456 1,084 74.4 6.6
Science, research, libraries,
museums 247 1 0.4 b
Correctional and penal institutions 144 — 0 0
Other welfare and administration 679 570 83.9 3.4
Total, Labor and Welfare $13,204$10,942 82.9 66.3
Commerce and housing:
Provision of highways 3,593 3,293 91.6 20.0
Promotion of aviation 1,313 90 6.8 0.5
Promotion of water transportation 1,959 1 0.1 b
Housing, community development
and facilities 2950 85 28.8 0.5
Civil defense 272 52 19.1 0.3
Other commerced 1,833° 49 2.7 0.3
Total, commerce and housing $9,265 $3,570 38.5
Agriculture and agricultural resources19,399 1,332 6.9 8.1
Natural resources 6,393 419 6.6 2.5
General government 7,332 204 2.8 1.2
Interest 33,645 — 0 0
SOURCE: Compiled from "actual" fiscal year expenditures shown in the federal
Budgetdocumentsfor the fiscal years 1955—59, inclusive. Federal aid is the sum of
grants, shared revenues, and net loans reported in Special Analysis G or H of the
several volumes.
a"Expenditures"here represent federal "net budget expenditures" plus highway
trust fund expenditures for 1957, which was the first year of the trust fund.
b Less than one-twentieth of I per cent.
CAfterdeducting receipts that were credited against expenditures.
d Comprises postal service deficits; aids to business; regulation of commerce and
finance; and disaster insurance, loans, and relief. For "aids to business," there were
$869 million of net receipts (negative expenditures) in the five years.
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have been no federal aid for libraries, museums, science, and general-
purpose research but for the introduction of demonstration grants for
rural libraries in fiscal 1957.
In the commerce and housing category, the outstanding subject of
aid is highway construction. For the five-year period, federal grants
for state and local highway building took 92 per cent of all the federal
expenditures for "provision of highways" (including in 1957 the
highway trust fund expenditures). Airport construction grants
represented under 7 per cent of federal expenditures to promote
aviation. In the promotion of water transportation, only the federal
grants to state marine schools are considered intergovernmental aids;
these were $1 million in a five-year total of nearly $2 billion of
expenditures. The large expenditures for river and harbor develop-
ment and other navigation improvements are considered direct
federal programs, not financial aids to states and their subdivisions.
In the case of housing, slum clearance, and urban redevelopment
programs—also part of the commerce and housing category—mea-
surement of the relative importance of federal aids is complicated by
the accounting system. In these programs, a large part of the aids
takes the form of loans rather than grants; as already noted, the loan
disbursements are considered expenditures and any repayments
received are considered "negative expenditures." For some parts of
the program in some years—and indeed for the public housing pro-
grams as a group for the whole five years—the federal expenditures
are negative; i.e., receipts exceed expenditures. Thus, neither the
$295 million of total federal expenditures nor the $85 million of
federal aids shown for housing and community development and
facilities is an actual measure of federal financial operations in this
field during 1953—57. A different handling of the transactions could
easily change the ratio of federal aid to total federal expenditures in
this category from the 28.8 per cent shown in Table 22 to some other
magnitude. In fact, the same can be said for the over-all percentage of
38.5 for commerce and housing, since the stated amount of federal
expenditures (budgetary plus the highway trust fund) is affected not
only by the repayments on public housing, slum clearance, and urban
redevelopment loans, but also by the deduction of other receipts
credited against expenditures. Dependable measurement of the
importance of federal aid as a component of this category of the
federal budget would require special interpretations of the data.
The purported 6.9 per cent of expenditures classified as federal aid
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in agriculture and agricultural resource programs must be similarly
qualified because the aggregate federal expenditures are a similar
composite comprising not only the net amount of loan transactions,
but also the net result of commodity purchases and sales. However,
the 6.9 per cent certainly gives a correct general impression—that is,
that federal aid to state and local governments is relatively a small
part of the federal government programs for agriculture. The aids
in this category are largely commodity distributions to the school
lunch program and other state-local agencies. (Cash grants to the
school lunch program are included in "other welfare services" and
help explain the high proportion of federal aid in that subfunction of
labor and welfare.) Also important are payments for cooperative
agricultural extension work and agricultural experiment stations.
The similar magnitude for natural resources—6.6 per cent devoted
to aid to state and local governments—is a reasonably clear figure.
Direct federal programs dominate this functional category, also.
Much of the aid is in shared revenues from mineral leasing, timber
sales in the national forests, and TVA operations (the latter dis-
tributed as payments "in lieu of taxes"); the rest is largely in grants
for wildlife restoration and forestry cooperation.
The reported federal aid for purposes of "general government"—
measured at 2.8 per cent of all federal expenditures for general
government—can be misleading, since the payments during 1953—57
were exclusively to the District of Columbia and various territories
and possessions. None of these expenditures was for assistance to
any state or its subdivisions.
Budget expenditures for interest on the public debt were slightly
more than twice the total for federal aid in the period 1953—57.
C. SOME FEDERAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING STATE-LOCAL
FISCAL NEEDS
In some fields, such as public assistance, major highway construc-
tion, slum clearance, and urban redevelopment, the pressures for
expanded federal financial assistance to state and local governments
have operated inexorably. In others, such as education and resource
conservation, pressures have been persistent and strong but the resist-
ance has been stronger. An interpretation of the differences might be
enlightening, but it would require more intensive analysis than can
be undertaken in this paper, as well as subjective evaluations outside
its intended scope. On the other hand, a sketch of some related
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developments seems necessary to a consideration of factors shaping
the next decade.
FEDERAL PROGRAM OPERATIONS THAT RELIEVE STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS. When the federal government in 1928—30 took direct
responsibility for completing the improvement of the Illinois Water-
way and for its subsequent operation, it relieved the state of Iffinois
from the necessity of proceeding with a project on which the state
had already expended $16 million. The federal government in the
ensuing thirty years invested twice that amount in new work, besides
$28 million for operation and maintenance. The Corps of Engineers
has reported that in 1957 the original project was 96 per cent com-
pleted, but the revised project, which now includes related works
even more costly than the original Waterway, was only 18 per cent
completed. The revised cost estimate in 1957 was $160 million for
project construction, with annual maintenance costs on the completed
work averaging $1.8 million a year and expenditures for operation
and care running even higher.6' The state government finances no
part of the waterway construction, maintenance, or operation.
Such a dramatic transfer of a specific responsibility, though not
unique, is a comparatively rare event. Usually the shift is more
generalized. When the program for the federal interstate highway
network was enacted, with its provision of federal grants for 90 per
cent of the construction costs of toll-free superhighways, one almost
immediate result was a cooling off of enthusiasm for additional toll-
charging turnpikes under state or special-authority auspices.62 The
toll roads, of course, have been financed by revenue bonds and oper-
ated as commercial-type enterprises, but in the Census Bureau
statistics they are included in "direct general government." Initiation
of the federal program had a strong impact on state and local activities
in this field—though it is too soon to say whether the immediate
response will prove to have been an acceleration or, as seems more
likely, some lessening of the rate of increase in construction outlays
from the state and local governments' own sources of revenue. The
high standards of construction on the interstate network may permit
some postponement of maintenance costs and retention of lower
standards on some local roads.
Whatever the first reaction, it seems plausible in the case of the
61U.s.Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, 1957 Annual Report, Chief of
Engineers,CivilWorks Activities (1958), Vol. 2, pp. 1274—5.
62Cf.BusinessWeek, October18, 1958, pp. 58—64.
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highway program to expect that after a few years state and local
financing for maintenance and operation of the road system will have
to increase above recent levels—unless, of course, federal aid is
broadened to cover these needs. Will future state-local outlays for
construction, maintenance, and operation in the aggregate be greater
or less than if there had been no special federal program?
In another field, urban renewal and slum clearance projects pro-
secuted with federal financial assistance may arrest the deterioration
of central city areas, ultimately salvaging a significant part of the
local tax base and strengthening city finances.
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND OASDI. Less direct and obvious, though
equally real, is the relationship between the federally operated system
of old-age, survivors, and disability insurance and the federal-state
local system of public assistance.
As noted earlier, the pressure for increase in federal grants for this
program has been practically irresistible. Since 1950 specific pro-
vision has been made to finance with federal grants a substantial
part of the payments made to vendors of medical care for persons on
public assistance. The matching formulas have been liberalized
repeatedly. A further increase in the federal share, accompanied by
adjustments in the formulas, was enacted in 1958; the effects will not
be fully reflected in assistance payments and financing for another
year or two.
At the same time, the gradual maturing of OASDI since its incep-
tion in 1935—39, coupled with its broad expansion in the decade of
the 1950's, has greatly lessened otherwise mounting pressures for
public assistance expenditures. So marked has been the effect that
even in this era of rapidly growing population, with its especially
rapid growth of the proportions who are in the dependent groups of
the very old and very young, the number of recipients of public
assistance now is somewhat lower than in 1950. In the face of rising
personal incomes, living standards, and consumer prices, the aggre-
gate of payments (excluding administrative expense) advanced 28
per cent from 1950 to 1957—an interval in which consumer prices
alone advanced 17 per cent.63
63Thisis the increase in the average consumer price index for the calendar years.
Medical care prices within the consumer price index advanced 36 per cent in the
calendar year averages. Medical care is an especially important segment of public
assistance expenditures, accounting in 1957 for $224 million of money payments directly
to vendors of medical services in the four federally aided categories, to which should be
added any direct expenditures by assistance recipients and the medical care expenditures
made for recipients of general assistance.
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The OASDI program has affected all the categories of public
assistance but most significantly the major category, old-age assist-.
ance. In fact, the numbers drawing aid to dependent children and the
blind rose nearly one-eighth from 1950 to late 1958. The number of
the permanently and totally disabled receiving assistance rose also,
but in 1950 this category was newly separated from general assistance
and was identified in only a few states. The over-all total on public
assistance rolls declined because of a 12 per cent decrease in the num-
ber of recipients of old-age assistance. Also, despite the recession of
1957—58, the number of persons drawing general assistance was less
in late 1958 than in the post-recovery month of December 1950.64
For old-age assistance, federal, state, and local expenditures for
assistance payments in calendar 1957 were $1,773 million, with 56 per
cent of the total provided by the federal government.65 On an average
for the whole country, about one-sixth of the population of age
sixty-five and over received old-age assistance payments—168 in each
1,000 in June 1957, and l62 in each 1,000 a year later. In the 1940's
the average was 212 in each 1,000.66 Suppose that proportion had
persisted. In that event, the difference in numbers alone would have
meant old-age assistance benefit payments in 1957 more than one-
fourth greater, some $465 million more, than the actual total of $1,773
million. Moreàver, an increasing percentage of the old-age assistance
recipients—by June 1957, 571,000 persons, or close to one-fourth------
were being given relatively small amounts of public assistance to
supplement inadequate OASDI benefits. In the 1940's, relatively few
persons drew both old-age assistance and OASDI benefits at the same
time. The average assistance payment in 1957 necessarily would have
been substantially higher in the absence of OASDI. The difference is
not easily estimated, but each $1 additional in the over-all monthly
average of old-age assistance payments for the year 1957 would have
required $30 million more of federal-state-local expenditure for the
2.5 million persons then on the rolls.
Without OASDI, then, the larger number who would have been
drawing old-age assistance and the higher amount of the average
individual payment might easily have required some $750 to $850
64Dataon numbers receiving assistance are from Social Security Bulletin, Annual
Statistical Supplement, 1957, principally p. 74; and Social Security Bulletin, January
1959, p. 27.
66Theseaggregates include the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands. Ibid., Annual Statistical Supplement, 1957, pp. 74 and 84,
Tables 105 and 108.
66Bureauof Public Assistance, op.cit., p. 56.
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million more of assistance payments. With federal grants at the 1957
proportion of 56 per cent—a proportion considerably higher than in
the 1940's—an additional total outlay of this magnitude would have
called for $330 to $375 million more from state-local sources.67
The maturing and expansion of the federal OASDI system has
been almost certainly the major change taking pressure off old-age
assistance—surely a stronger factor, even, than rising prosperity.
This shift to primary reliance on a contributory .insurance system was,
indeed, an original advantage asserted for the social security law.
Public assistance, then, is an area in which a federal program has
relieved the state and local governments of a growing share of a large
responsibility. Even without further liberalization of the OASDI
system, its effects should be still more pronounced a decade hence.
At that time, less than 10 per cent of the aged population will lack
eligibility for the insurance benefits.
When the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations examined
the public assistance grants several years ago, it recommended that
general assistance should continue to be financed and administered
by the states and their subdivisions, and that, as total national-state
expenditures for old-age assistance decrease, the contribution of the
national government to this program be decreased by approximately
the same amount. Also, it proposed revision of the formula governing
federal financial participation in old-age assistance so that greater
equalization of the burden will be achieved.68
The 1958 amendments moved in the direction of greater equaliza-
tion relative to personal incomes. They provided, however, for an
increased federal share in financing of the public assistance program
as a whole and at the same time raised the insurance benefits.
What additional lessening of potential state-local responsibilities
may follow this important legislation? How far can public assistance
shrink in relative importance on the basis of the continuing expansion
of federally administered social insurance? What other factors will
operate in this general area?
Legislation has often been proposed and is currently being urged
that would create a new federal-aid category for general assistance or,
If the comparisons were based on averages for December rather than June, the
additional outlay to care for the larger number of recipients would be $558 million,
rather than $465 million. The wholesale calculation, with its rough allowance for the
level of assistance payments, probably understates the aggregate reduction in old-age
assistance even though it omits qualifications for the possible impact of the OASDI
system on private pensions and savings, as well as refinements for interstate differences.
•In the Commissions Report, cited supra,cf.pp. 270—1.
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in some versions, would wipe out all the categorical distinctions.
An advisory council appointed by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare is examining the whole question of public assistance,
including its future relation to old-age, survivors, and disability
insurance, and the desirable division of financial responsiblity
between the federal and the state and local governments.
During the recession of 1957—58, not only were bills introduced
in congress to bring the general assistance category under the um-
brella of federal aid, but there was strong support for related pro-
posals to pay from general federal revenues unemployment benefits
for two groups of unemployed persons: those whose entitlement to
insurance benefits under state laws was exhausted and those who had
no insurance entitlement. The temporary extended unemployment
compensation law that was enacted in 1958providedfor those whose
rights were exhausted but not for the uninsured. Moreover, it calls
for ultimate repayment of the federal expenditures made in the
seventeen states that joined the program.
FEDERAL PROGRAM OPERATIONS THAT GIVE RISE TO SPECIAL NEEDS.
Except in periods of war, there appear to be few instances of
widespread need for state and local services created by program
operations of the federal government. Perhaps the peacetime need
for civil defense organization and preparations is one such instance,
but it serves also in local and regional civil disasters. Another
instance is the provision of schools and other local services for
children living on federally owned land or for the children of persons
who work in tax-free federal establishments.
Customarily, special federal aids have been provided in such
circumstances. Thus there are grants-in-aid for civil defense and for
the construction and operation of schools in communities especially
affected by federal government activities; there are special schools for
some Indian children who are wards of the federal government and
special aids to local school systems that accommodate other children
living on Indian reservations; there are special services for communi-
ties created for the atomic energy program and reclamation projects,
and arrangements to help finance state and local governments in the
area of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Whatever may be the complexities or shortcomings of any or all of
these special programs, the pertinent fact for the present inquiry is
that we have here no policy vacuum. The policy issues that arise,
rather, are those relating to consistency and equality that inevitably
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accumulate in a series of piecemeal provisions for interrelated
problems.
OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. The significance of some federal pro-
grams for state-local finance may be real, yet indeterminate in fiscal
direction.
A federal reclamation project, making possible the settlement and
exploitation of a comparatively arid tract of land, may mean more
services from and revenues for the county government or other local
units. Whether the added revenues outweigh the added expenses
depends on local circumstances.
The federal government has undertaken major research and
demonstrations directed toward the production of useable water from
saline and brackish sources. These efforts, if successful, may make
available lower-cost water supplies for communities where the
present or threatened scarcity of an adequate supply of potable water
is a subject of concern and expense. Success may also mean more
population—and more local government services—in areas that now
are settled sparsely or not at all. Similar consequences could flow
from weather-modification studies that have been authorized.
In fact, the general enviitonmental situation in which all state and
local governments will be operating ten or twenty years hence may
be profoundly affected by the findings and the application of federally
sponsored or federally stimulated research.
A striking current instance is the transformation of care for the
mentally ill—a field worth reviewing in some detail as a case illus-
trating how a limited program of intergovernmental aid sometimes
meets with a substantial response.
About half of the hospital patients in the United States are in
mental institutions—most of them in state hospitals. For a century,
these hospitals were little more than places of custody and detention
—overcrowded asylums offering little hope to the hundreds of thou-
sands of people who were brought within their walls.
In 1854, Congress yielded to the entreaties of that "angel of
mercy," Dorothea Lynde Dix, by voting to donate federal lands to
aid the states in the care and support of the mentally ill. President
Pierce vetoed the bill. He held that this was an improper intrusion of
the federal government into a field of local responsibility. There was
no federal aid for care of the mentally ill until 1946, when the National
Mental Health Act was adopted. That legislation established a
National Institute of Mental Health, a research agency, in the Public
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Health Service. It provided grants to research workers in state and
private institutions; it provided help to medical schools to encourage
them to train more professional personnel; and it inaugurated small
grants to the states for community mental health services. The grant
payments to all the states under the Act were $1.6 million in the
first fiscal year, 1948; they are estimated at $4 million annually in
the fiscal years 1959 and 1960.
Soon after the National Mental Health Act was adopted, a few
of the states began to examine their mental health programs more
closely. The major impetus for this reawakening, it has been said,
was the federal legislation:69
"After the passage of the Act of 1946 the states bestirred themselves.
They started to build buildings. They hired more doctors, nurses,
and attendants and raised their salaries. They matched federal grants.
They reorganized their mental health departments. They established
preventive programs—community child-guidanceclinics,
out-patient clinics. By 1953 the states were spending three times
what they had spent on their state hospitals nine years before—half
a billion dollars a year. Some states had multiplied their expenditures
fantastically during that same period—Kansas by 610 per cent.
Capital outlays became enormous—New York alone spent $350
mfflion building hospitals. New research and training centers were
set up. Salaries were increased until in some states mental health
officials were earning more than governors. State spending far outran
federal."7°
For the current operating costs of mental institutions, the states
alone reported expenditures of $189 million in 1946. By 1953, the
total had risen to $498 million and by 1957 to $686 million, with
capital outlays approaching $200 million a year. The budget of New
York State currently includes a larger amount for mental hospitals
than was expended in 1946 by all the 48 states together.7'
°°JohnBartlow Martin, "A Better Break for the Mentally Ill," in Harpers, February
1959, pp. 58—64, tells the story of these developments.
ibid.,p. 59. See, also, the same writer's book-length report, The Pane of Glass
(Harpers, 1959), from which the magazine article is taken.
"totals for state hospital operating expenses are reported on p. 44 in Council
of State Governments, The Mental Health Programs of the 48 States, a Report to the
Governors' Conference (Chicago, June 1950; 377 pages), prepared in response to a
resolution of the Governors' Conference of June 1949. Data for 1953 and 1957 are from
Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, Compendium of State Finances, 1953,
p. 35, and 1957, p. 31. The New York State budget as proposed for 1959—60 included
$203 million for mental hospital operations and $39 million for construction (The New
York Times, February 3, 1959).
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It may be assumed that the federal legislation, with its effect of
prodding the states, was itself an outcome of the same rising medical,
economic, and humanitarian concern that was pushing inevitably
toward concerted action at all levels of government. The interest of
individual states led to discussions in the Governors' Conference,
a state-sponsored study of the subject, and the formation of an
Interstate Clearinghouse on Mental Health for the exchange of
information and ideas.72
The application of various new drugs, beginning oii a large scale
in 1953, has had much influence. This, however, is not directly an
outgrowth of federal research and leadership.
Whatever the prime cause, it is clear that federal legislation and
action contributed significantly to the mental health revolution of the
last dozen years. The nationwide ferment led to further federal action
in the form of a law enacted by Congress, the Mental Health Study
Act of 1955, giving official sanction to a three-year study by a Joint
Commission on Mental Illness and Health—a joint, nonprofit
project of the American Psychiatric Association, the Council on
Mental Health of the American Medical Association, and a score
of national professional and lay organizations. Congress appropriated
$1,250,000 for the Joint Commission, and the states and private
sources have supplemented this financing. The Commission's interim
reports have already influenced public attitudes toward the state
programs for preventing and treating mental illness and promoting
mental health.
Already the overcrowded mental hospitals have experienced some
actual reduction of population—from 558,000 at the end of 1955 to
547,000 two years later.73 What is more significant in terms of human
welfare is that there has been some shortening of the average patient's
stay. Between 1945 and 1957, admissions to state and local public
mental hospitals increased from 115 to 150 for each 100,000 of
72Cf.the Council of State Governments report cited in the preceding footnote;
also,bythe Council's Interstate Clearinghouse on Mental Health, State Action in
Mental Health: A Summary of Financial, Legal and Administrative Developments in
State Mental Health Programs, 1956—57 (mimeo., 95 pages; April 1958).
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of the Secretary—Office
of Program Analysis,J-Iealth,Education, andWelfareTrends,1959 ed.,p. 36.
Of a total of 623,938 resident mental patients in all United States hospitals at the
end of 1957, 547,495 were in state, county, and city hospitals; 60,935 in Veterans
Administration hospitals; 1,965 in United States Public Health Service hospitals; and
13,543 in private hospitals. For resident patients in state-local hospitals, the rate per
100,000 of the civilian population reached a peak of 441.0 in 1954 and declined during
the next three years to 417.1 at the end of 1957.
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civilian population. At the same time, releases rose from 154 a year
to 175 a year for each 1,000 resident patients.74
Some researchers think schizophrenia and certain other mental
illnesses may be linked significantly to the bodily chemistry of the
patient; this avenue of research is one of the most hopeful in the
whole field of mental health. The expense for each patient-day of
residence will clearly be greater if the care is to be more intensive,
more professional, and more efficacious. The possibilities in the
realm of patient-costs may be suggested by some quick comparisons.
The estimated average cost of maintaining a patient in a public
nonfederal mental hospital in 1957 was $3.64 a day. This was 38
cents—12 per cent—more than the daily average only one year
earlier.75 It was more than twice the median cost for 1949.76 The
patient-day costs for neuropsychiatric patients in the federal govern-
ment hospitals for veterans for many years have run far ahead of
average patient-day costs in state mental hospitals—and the average
length of the patient's stay in the veterans' hospitals has been decidedly
shorter. Last year the operation and maintenance costs in the veterans'
hospitals averaged $4.01 a patient-day; estimates for fiscal 1960
indicate a rise to $4•37•77 An average increase $3.64 to $4.37
for all the patients in state-local mental hospitals in 1957 would have
meant something like $146 million a year of additional expenditures.
Suppose the state and local governments undertake to improve
care. Will the greater expense for each patient-day mean, in the
aggregate, greater or less expense over the hospital stay of each
admitted patient? What will be the net effect on state and local
finances (let alone the net effect on the national income) of the
rehabilitation and renewed productivity of millions of helpless
persons who, under present arrangements, are consumers only?78
D. SOME EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL AID
This review has indicated that federal aid is an important source
of revenue for state and local governments—a major source for
Ibid., p.37.
National Institute of Mental Health, Facts on Mental Health and Mental Illness
(revised May 1958), p. 7.
76Derivedfrom median annual cost in Council of State Governments, Mental
Health Programs of the 48 States, p. 262.
Calculated from operating costs and average daily patient loads shown in federal
Budget for fiscal year 1960, PP. 217—8.
For a prognostication based on the foreseeable effects of tranquilizers and ener-
gizers alone, cf. Rudolph Kieve, "The Chemical Revolution in Psychiatry: Its Effects on
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financing certain of their functions, such as public assistance and
highways, and a relatively negligible source for others, such as
education, natural resources, and agriculture. As a channel for
expenditures, federal aid is a sizable but not a major item in the
federal budget. In the labor and welfare field, however, it is a domi-
nant channel of expenditure.
Geographic variations in the distribution of federal aid tend to be
associated with differences in personal incomes. In the aggregate
and for several program categories, per capita federal grants have
been highest in the group of low-income states and lowest in the high-
income group. The services exhibiting this association are public
assistance—the largest grant category and the program for which
income-differences may be considered most meaningful; the health
services, "other" welfare services, and a catch-all category of other
programs taken as a group. In the highway construction, employment
security, and education grants there has been no clear tendency for
the highest proportionate grants to go to the states with the lowest
incomes; each of these categories is a special case.
Over the last two decades, proposals have been advanced from time
to time that the fiscal structure of interlevel relations might be
simplified, and the independence and strength of the states enhanced
by a simultaneous reduction in federal grants and selected federal
taxes yielding an equal amount. The Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations concluded that it could not support this proposition.
It commented as follows:
"This approach would be inadequate in the current situation, since
grants serve an essential purpose by assisting in the support of specific
functional programs. Moreover, any general or selective reduction
or repeal of federal grants coupled with an equivalent reduction in
federal taxes would intensify the fiscal problems of the lower-income
states, which would lose far more in grants than they would gain
in taxes. On the other hand, a tax cut of sufficient magnitude to
the Care of the Mentally Ill," State Government, Spring 1959, pp. 104—8. Dr. Kieve
predicts "that, not too far in the future, public mental institutions will not only have
little claim for expansion—replacement of indispensable equipment aside—but that
many will have to prepare for contraction," and that "it will riot be possible much
longer to shift so much responsibility—financial, legal, and moral—for the mentally
ill from the municipality and county level to the state level," pp. 106—7. He suggests
that the productive years of the mentally ill will be greatly increased and the costs of
public care may be substantially reduced or recouped.
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indemnify fully every state would result in a total loss of federal
revenue that would far exceed the grant reductions."79
The Joint Federal-State Action Committee has examined various
specific approaches to interrelated tax and grant reduction. It has
documented one by one the practical difficulties involved in trying
to work out such a program, and, as indicated in Section 2 above,
has recommended a transfer of part of the federal telephone tax to
the states in exchange for withdrawal of federal grants for vocational
education and for construction of waste treatment plants, with state
assumption of full responsibility for these programs. The tax reduc-
tion and distribution were estimated for 1958 at $147.5 million, and
the grant reduction at $86.5million.The President endorsed this
proposal,8° but neither in Congress nor in the states does favorable
action appear to be imminent.
The Committee's program, it has been aptly said, makes clear that
the practical choices are quite limited. They embrace (1) a choice
between a carrot for state-local expenditure programs and a carrot
for state-local tax programs, and (2) a choice between equalizing
federal program grants and some type of equalizing fiscal grant.8'
A general evaluation offered by the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations may provide a convenient summary for this review.
After conducting extensive regional hearings in all parts of the
country, after examining hundreds of replies to a comprehensive
questionnaire and analyzing detailed statistical data supplied by
federal agencies as well as by state and local governments, a sub-
committee reported as follows—and the full Committee concurred
unanimously:
"With relatively few exceptions, the subcommittee has found a
favorable acceptance throughout the nation of the use of grants and
of most existing grant purposes. Although a number of witnesses
and questionnaire respondents signified that as a general principle
their state or local governments would be willing to assume
"Commissionon Intergovernmental Relations, Report, pp. 115—6. Four members
of the 25-member Commission dissented, arguing that the tax and grant reductions,
"with the reduced grants being more heavily equalized," would be a move in the right
direction. They observed that "no nice balance is to be expected; tax and grant reduc-
tions should not even be respectively earmarked." (Ibid., footnote.)
80FederalBudget for fiscal year 1960, p. M65.
81SelmaJ.Mushkin,"Fiscal Capacity of theStates,"address before the
National Tax Conference, Philadelphia, October 29, 1958, published by the National
Tax Association in the 1958, Conference Proceedings (1959), p. 304.
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independent responsibility for aided functions if adequate tax sources
were available, comparatively few specific grants were recommended
for termination.
"In general, the subcommittee finds the grant a useful device for
harnessing cooperative governmental effort in the accomplishment of
a national legislative purpose. The opportunity for cooperation
between the levels of government for the attainment of common
objectives should be recognized as a resource of our federal system.
In some circumstances the use of a grant may be the more practical
anddesirablemethod of administering an activity than confining
complete responsibility to any one level of government."82
There is abundant reason, then, to conclude that federal aid in the
form of grants, loans, and revenue-sharing—like many other practical
expedients devised to meet specific needs—has become an institution
firmly established as part of our federal system. As yet, a more
efficient acceptable device for interlevel cooperation in the program
side has not appeared.
On the other hand, federal aid is not appropriate to all types of
interlevel problems. Clearly, each measure of. fiscal accommodation
must be applied selectively and with specific safeguards, limitations,
and objectives.
In such a setting, as Harold Groves said a good many years ago,
the pragmatic approach of "nibbling" promises most in the way of
progress in what must be a complicated cooperative venture. Hopes
for a grand solution of the fiscal coordination problem, or for a single
comprehensive plan for immediate adoption, are doomed to dis-
appointment. 83
COMMENTS
HAROLD M. GROVES, University of Wisconsin
Authors Ecker-Racz and Labovitz have presented a comprehensive
exhibit of the fundamental research upon which the quest for practical
82U.s.Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Federal-State-Local
Relations: Federal Grants-in-A id—301h Report by theCommittee, 85thCong., 2d sess.,
House Report no. 2533, August 8, 1958, pp. 26—7. The subcommittee report was adopted
and submitted by the full committee.
U.S. Treasury Department, Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations,
Federal, State,and Local Government Fiscal Relations: Areport submittedto the Secretary
ofthe Treasury,78thCong., 1st sess., Senate doc. 69; 1943, p. 2. Harold M. Groves was
chairman of the special committee that made the study; the other members were
Luther Gulick and Mabel Newcomer.
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solutions in intergovernmental fiscal relations must be based. They
have also analyzed some of the practical difficulties involved in
alternative suggestions for improvement. This is a first rate accom-
plishment and a valuable contribution. They have not devoted very
much space to an attempt to define the problem. Perhaps this cannot
be done without a good deal of "subjective evaluation" which the
authors sought to avoid. Perhaps "Defining the Problem" is another
paper which might have been on this agenda. Anyway, the discussant
finds it difficult to say much about the practical solutions without
considerable inquiry or speculation as to what they aim—or might
or should aim—to accomplish in the first place. We don't need any
practical solutions unless we have a problem.
Mr. Ecker-Racz suggests that the problem or major problem might
be overlapping taxes. But it isn't at all clear to me that there is
anything very objectionable about overlapping taxes. One tax
utilized by two layers of government involves two administrations
where one might suffice; but it probably involves less total administra-
tion than two different taxes, one designated for the top layer of
government and one used by the lower units.
Perhaps the major difficulty is found in the fact that the states are
now in considerable financial difficulty, caught in a squeeze between
rising responsibilities (especially for education) and disappointing
revenues. Mr. Netzer's paper offered some prognostications con-
cerning the long-range aspects of this problem. It can be said on the
reassuring side, as Ecker-Racz indicates, that very few if any states
have exhausted their tax potential. Less than half the states have both
income and sales taxes and very few if any of these, even within rate
limits applied in other states, have exhausted these sources. As to
recessions, it is true, of course, that the federal government could help
the states immeasurably if it could somehow manage the economy to
achieve stable prices, rapid growth, and low interest rates. But this
surely is another paper. It is also true, of course, that the states'
problem would be easier if the federal government did not pre-empt
so much of so many taxes. The person who is in a position to do
something "grand" about this is not the Secretary of Treasury but
the Secretary of State.
Perhaps the problem isinterstate and intercommunity com-
petition—legislators caught in the frustration that, while they would
like to raise state or local taxes to meet current demands for services,
they are constrained lest the tax base or the richest part of it will move
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out or shun them. After all, if the states need more revenue, they have
the same taxpayers in their jurisdiction that the federal government
has in its. And the states enjoy all the important legal powers to tax.
I expect that the competition factor is at the bottom of a considerable
part of the demand—and need—for federalhelp. Ecker-Racz
mentionsobserving that there is no creditable evidence that state
taxes have affected industrial development. Whether his observation
is valid, and I have no reason to question it, there is a lot of fear
that it might not apply in specific cases. The fear cramps the style
of the states and municipalities even if it has no valid foundation.
Perhaps the nub of our problem is increasing general property
taxes. This raises a host of problems some of which carry us straight
into subjective evaluation: How bad is the general property tax
anyhow? Does it have any natural or other limits beyond those
imposed by the constraints of intercommunity competition? On
the sanguine side, we could cite the fact that while the general
property tax is a heavy burden on housing, new homes are being
built in large numbers. Moreover, it is not clear that property taxes
have increased very much in relation to income and wealth. In
Wisconsin, average state rates have been rising since 1953, but the
rise has amounted to only about 10 per cent and is still less than half
of a postwar drop.
Perhaps the federal government has grown too much and too fast,
usurping through its aid system functions that had better be left with
the states. But as Mr. Labovitz has documented, the Joint Federal
State Action Committee working hard on this theme finally developed
only the concrete suggestion that a part of the local telephone tax be
surrendered by the federal government in exchange for assumption
of full responsibility for vocational education by the states. It was a
very modest program but it invoked little enthusiasm in Congress.
Apparently the federal aid program isfirmly established and
popular.
Perhaps there is legitimate ground for the concern lest the growing
importance of state and local taxes along with the erosion of the
federal tax base enfeeble the progressiveness of the over-all tax
system. Available data seem to indicate that the role of the tax system
as equalizer is not very impressive nor isit becoming more so.
However, the egalitarian debate into which this leads can hardly
escape a large element of subjective evaluation.
Now, still in search for a cause of complaint or alarm, let us
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consider briefly some of the several major coordination institutions
which our authors have passed in review.
Take for instance deductibility of state and local nonbusiness taxes
against the federal income tax base. It is an old institution inaugurated
apparently on the ground that income free of personal taxes is the
appropriate measure of taxable capacity. The point was compromised
however when a few years later federal income taxes were disallowed
as a deduction. Currently, deductibility is most often defended as a
coordination device. It is open to considerable objection on the
grounds that it provides an uneven concession for taxpayers at
different levels; it encourages the states to venture into excessive
progression, largely at the expense of the federal treasury and it (as
to property tax allowance) discriminates between landlords and
tenants. This is a fairly impressive bill of indictment. On the other
hand, deductibility affords the states some protection at the critical
point of interstate competition; it is nominally neutral among state
choices in their tax systems; and it has not as a matter of fact been
abused. There are considerable difficulties and objections associated
with alternatives that might be proposed. It is my personal view that
an income tax credit could do the job now assigned to deductibility
and do it better, but our authors, apparently, regarded this alternative
as so inaccessible that they didn't even give it honorable mention.
Then we have the death tax credit. The person who does not have a
large estate but who does favor reform wherever necessary could not
examine the death tax and the credit associated with it without
concluding that something should be done in this area.
Here again the first step should be an analysis of the purposes the
credit is supposed to serve. It was established in the now fairly
ancient past as a compromise between federal abandonment of the
death tax and federal exploitation of the field with no regard for the
states' preestablished interests in it. The credit was also inaugurated
to mitigate the tendency of large taxpayers to migrate in contempla-
tion of death. It was observed that it might provide the states some
assistance in an area of administration where they were weak.
Finally, it is apparent that a credit serves the purpose of directing the
pattern of state death-tax institutions.
Suppose, for the exercise, that the last-named factor were given
predominant weight in the remodeling program. Suppose the federal
government, in conference with state officials, were to accept some
model or modal schedule of effective state rates on estates, let us say
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on those with assets upwards of $20,000, presumably featuring the
ideas that the states will exploit the small estates intensively and apply
moderate graduation to the remainder of the scale. Suppose the
federal government were then to extend the coverage of its tax to
include all of these estates. Suppose the federal credit were tied to
this model state-scale instead of the 1926 federal scale, and suppose
that a high percentage credit—say 80 per cent—were applied to it to
constitute the federal assistance to the states in this field. States
could go beyond this at their own risk. The suggestion is probably
utopian but it would at least have the advantage of a rationale more
plausible than historical accident.
Let us turn finally to our federal aid program and inquire whether
it meets the criterion of rationality which is one test of the adequacy
of our coordination institutions. I find this an extremely elusive
subject and I am grateful for the help of Labovitz's data and Mus-
grave's profound analysis. Aids can be viewed asa manifestation of
federal interest in programs which are also of state interest. They
can thus be viewed as federal expenditures per se and only incidentally
a federal-state coordination device. They also may be viewed as a
means for territorial equalization and of local tax relief. As presently
constituted, they serve these latter purposes incidentally and not very
effectively. A block grant on the Australian or British model might
serve these latter objectives more advantageously. The block grant
would also make more sense than our present program, if it be con-
cluded that differential degrees of federal interest in local activities
is indeterminable.
The rationale supporting present federal practice is one case where
the benefits-received doctrine is still in vogue. The idea of reciproca-
tion, of taxes justified if not measured by benefits, is the basis of the
judicial doctrine that one jurisdiction cannot tax what lies outside its
borders. It is only a logical extension of this idea to conclude that an
over-all unit of government should not tax one district to relieve the
budget of another. This is not to say, however, that a minimum
standard for certain public services may not be a matter of general
interest.
A community's interest in other communities' amenities has a
distance preference somewhat similar to the time preference of
individuals in classical theory. This is one reason why we have not
only our lowest layers of government but also intermediate ones
(counties and states) as well.
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This philosophy assumes that it is possible to select amenities of
government that are strictly of local interest, varying not only as to
the amount of such interest but also as to the area over which it
applies. It is a large order but perhapsnot more difficult than other
similar judgments which underlie the budget of any government in
any democratic state. To add a value judgment, I am of the opinion
that these distinctions are not so impossible as to warrant abandoning
the attempt to make them.
Mr. Labovitz does neglect to cover what seems to me to be a fairly
important (potentially) aspect of aids and that is their use to bring
the states into the economic stabilization program. For instance, if
federal participation in welfare is to be extended to include general
relief, this could be done on a basis similar to that used in New York
State where the aid is set to vary according to the percentage of
population on relief. Replacement of tax-exempt securities by a
public works aid tied to an employment index could hardly fail to
score for the public interest.
One further desultory comment should be added. I disagree with
the inference in one of the papers under review that state apportion-
ment of tax bases and the immunities from state taxation associated
with interstate commerce are not federal problems. It is my view,
often enough propounded, that Congress should take the ball from
the Supreme Court in these areas and that Congress itself should not
act without full consultation with the interested parties in the states.
In conclusion, I fear that these remarks are more of a speech of
my own than the careful commentary that two excellent papers
deserve. The excuse is that I found these papers highly provocative.
C. LOWELL HARRISS, Columbia University
Apportionment for tax purposes of income of businesses engaged
in interstate commerce seems to me, as to Professor Groves, to be
more of a national problem than Dr. Ecker-Racz indicates. Com-
pliance costs now put business to some sheer waste. The economy
suffers from the use of skilled manpower in meeting diverse and
intricate compliance requirements of different states. The variety o.f
these requirements serves no useful purpose for the public as a whole.
Waste results and seems likely to grow as many more firms will be
affected, In terms of national accounts, the wastes cannot be large
—but they are avoidable. Congressional action specifying uniform
apportionment would yield real savings to the economy. Moreover,
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the prescription of a formula which conforms to economic reality
as well as we can reasonably define it would help the economy a little
by encouraging more efficient resource allocation. Formulas like
those now in use create at least a slight inducement to distort affairs
to save tax. The result is more expense, or a slightly smaller gross
income, than if the tax law di.d not attach more importance to some
details, than their economic significance warrants.
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